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ABSTRACT 
AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. RESTAURANT FIRMS’ INTERNATIONALIZATION  
IN A RISK CONTEXT 
by 
SoYeon Jung 
Dr. Michael C. Dalbor, Dissertation Committee Chair 
Professor  
William F. Harrah College of Hotel Administration  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
The purpose of this dissertation is to advance the theoretical and practical understanding 
of the relationship between publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms’ internationalization as a 
corporate strategy and risks using a comprehensive set of risk measures: 1) market-based risk 
(i.e., systematic and unsystematic risk) and 2) accounting-based risk (i.e., standard deviation of 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings per share (EPS) during the period 
of 2000-2013. This dissertation further investigates linear, nonlinear, and lagged effects of 
internationalization on restaurant firms’ risks. In summary, the findings of this dissertation reveal 
that internationalization tends to mitigate systematic risk, supporting modern portfolio theory in 
a restaurant context. Furthermore, internationalization tends to have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with ROA risk, indicating that the risk-increasing effects of internationalization on a 
restaurant firm’s ROA risk exist at the initial stage of internationalization while risk-reducing 
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effects of internationalization on the restaurant firm’s ROA risk occur at the later stage of 
internationalization. 
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CHAPTER І 
INTRODUCTION 
The pursuit of international markets and resources has grown remarkably. According to 
the World Investment Prospects Survey 2012-2014 (United Nations, 2012), the largest 
transnational corporations in 2014 were expected to operate with 65% of their sales, 54% of their 
employees, and 41% of their investment expenditures outside their home countries. Similarly, 
these trends can be witnessed in the U.S. restaurant industry. Approximately 70% of McDonald’s 
and YUM! Brands’ revenues were generated from international markets in 2014 (McDonald’s 
Corporation, 2015; Yum! Brands, Inc., 2015). Consequently, many U.S. restaurant firms have 
implemented internationalization as a corporate strategy, especially given the sluggish U.S. 
economy (Tice, 2013).  
The motivation for international expansion is primarily to enhance cash flow by 
increasing revenue, to decrease risk by diversifying, or both. Internationalization is one form of 
diversification (Fouraker & Stopford, 1968), and may secure a more stable cash flow (Hisey & 
Caves, 1985; Jang & Tang, 2009; Pantzalis, 2001). Nevertheless, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) may face daunting challenges to manage the high level of uncertainty in diverse global 
markets.  
The popular phrase “never put all your eggs in one basket,” can coincide with the modern 
portfolio diversification theory pioneered by Harry Markowitz (1952). The core notion of 
Markowitz’s theory is to reduce risk by holding a diversified portfolio. Portfolio theory 
postulates that investing in two assets with less than perfect correlation reduces the portfolio risk 
without necessarily lowering the portfolio return. Numerous economists and financiers have 
utilized portfolio theory for the purpose of reducing risk and increasing efficiency, and this 
theory can be applied to restaurant companies’ international operations. By including diverse 
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international markets rather than depending solely on the domestic market, U.S. restaurant firms 
may diversify their idiosyncratic risks, or risk peculiar to an individual firm based on the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) (Brealey, Stewart, & Myers, 2000) 
Markowitz’s theory focuses on the imperfect correlation between two assets: the less 
positively correlated the assets, the greater the risk-diversification. However, especially after the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the world markets have seemingly become more correlated 
(Hsu, 2011). Thus, if the world economies become more synchronized, these world markets may 
be greatly correlated and the benefits of risk-reduction may diminish as a result. Furthermore, 
international diversification may render complex challenges (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 
2006; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) which can increase risk. A high level of diversification can 
cause firms to be exposed to more complicated factors that may escalate transaction costs, 
including distinctive natural environments, different regulations in various markets, currency 
fluctuations, and cultural diversity in the organization and customer segments (Egelhoff, 1982; 
Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Jones & Hill, 1988; Sundaram 
& Black, 1992). In addition, based on agency theory, complex corporate structures may trigger 
managers to exploit incentives and to exhibit excessive risk-taking behavior. The higher 
complexity, coupled with possible excessive risk-taking inclination related to 
internationalization, may outweigh the benefits of diversifying the idiosyncratic risks.    
Problem Statement 
In the mainstream financial and strategy literature, numerous researchers have 
investigated internationalization pertaining to risk; however, a consensus concerning the effects 
of internationalization on risk has not yet been reached (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Al-Obaidan & 
Scully, 1995; Hughes, Logue, & Sweeney, 1975; Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993; Miller & Pras, 
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1980; Rugman, 1976). That is, some researchers have found that internationalization can 
decrease risk (e.g., Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Fatemi, 1984, Hughes et al.,1975; Kim et al., 1993; 
Michel & Shaked, 1986; Rugman, 1976, Shaked, 1986). On the other hand, other researchers 
have found that internationalization can increase risk (e.g., Krapl, 2015; Kwok & Reeb, 2000; 
Olibe, Michello, & Thorne, 2008; Reeb, Kwok, & Baek, 1998), thus creating an apparent 
paradox. Some contradictory results may be attributed to the various risk measures employed by 
previous studies, thereby capturing different dimensions of risk. Moreover, the relationship 
between internationalization and risk may vary over time. These contradictory results 
demonstrate the need for further examination into the relationship between internationalization 
and risk.  
More specifically, in the hospitality context, researchers have placed their focus on firms’ 
general risk features using diverse risk measures such as systematic risk, unsystematic risk, 
earnings variability, debt ratio, and bankruptcy risk (Borde, 1998; Chathoth & Olsen, 2007; 
Dalbor & Upneja, 2002, 2004; Gu & Kim, 2003; Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002; Kim, Kim, & Gu, 
2012; Kwansa & Cho, 1995; Lee, 2008a; Lee & Jang, 2007; Tang & Jang, 2007). Several 
researchers have specifically examined determinants of total, systematic, or unsystematic risk 
(Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 1998; Gu & Kim, 2003; Kim et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2012; Lee & 
Jang, 2007; Rowe & Kim, 2010). Examining various financial risk measures, Lee (2008a) 
focused  not only on stock performance risk measured by beta and unsystematic risk, but also 
accounting risk measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings per 
share (EPS). Although the hospitality literature has devoted substantial attention to the strategic 
implications of risk, few studies have focused on risk associated with internationalization in the 
restaurant industry specifically.  
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 Investigating this topic in the restaurant context is especially of paramount importance 
since the industry has expanded remarkably overseas as noted. Among the top 10 global 
franchises, U.S. restaurant firms account for five positions: Subway, McDonald’s, KFC, Burger 
King, and Pizza Hut (Franchise Direct, 2015). More importantly, the restaurant industry has been 
known as a high-risk business caused by relatively low entry barriers coupled with low capital 
requirements (Elmont, 1995; Go & Christensen, 1989), as well as significant sensitivity to 
consumer discretionary expenditures (Singal, 2011), to volatile economic conditions, and to 
national business cycles (Lee, Koh, & Heo, 2011; Thompson & Kwortnik, 2008).  
Both researchers and practitioners have acknowledged the riskiness of the restaurant 
industry (Gu & Kim, 2002; Parsa, Self, Njite, & King, 2005; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001). De Noble 
and Olsen (1986) revealed that foodservice firms had the highest market volatility among the 
seven industries: electronic computing equipment, electronic components, medical chemicals 
and botanical products, tires and inner tubes, meatpackers, and confectionary products (Noble & 
Olsen, 1986) and a volatile environment is likely to engender greater risk to firms. Nevertheless, 
De Noble and Olsen (1986) found that 40% of the chief financial officers of the largest 
foodservice and lodging firms do not consider risk in their investment decision processes. 
Therefore, it is significant for restaurant executives to identify and alleviate the effects of risk on 
firms.  
Delimiting its scope to U.S. restaurant firms can additionally allow this study to control 
for differences amongst industries, such as capital intensity, economic performance regulation, 
market structure, cyclicality, concentration, or growth (Bowman, 1980; Tang & Jang, 2007). 
Various industries may have a different optimum strategic composite due to specific entry barrier 
conditions, creating the industry effect (Daniels & Bracker, 1989). A suitable strategy for each 
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industry needs to be developed and pursued (Bettis & Hall, 1982). Given that firms in one 
industry are likely to be homogenous, focusing on a specific industry enables this study to yield 
more reliable and valid results, as well as customized insights and implications for practitioners 
in the restaurant industry.  
Purpose of Dissertation 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between publicly traded U.S. 
restaurant firms’ internationalization and risks using a comprehensive set of risk measures: 1) 
market-based risk (i.e., systematic and unsystematic risk) and 2) accounting-based risk (i.e., 
standard deviation  of ROA, ROE, and EPS) during the period of 2000-2013. This study further 
intends to examine linear, nonlinear, and lagged effects of internationalization on restaurant 
firms’ risks.  
This study is believed to be among the first to empirically research restaurant firms’ 
internationalization strategy with a variety of risk measures. Internationalization may modify 
business strategies, thereby influencing a firm’s risk features (Hughes et al. 1975; Liang & 
Rhoades 1988; Lubatkin & Chatterjee 1994). Consequently, a thorough analysis of the risk 
features pertaining to internationalization may not only provide a good cornerstone for 
understanding internationalization mechanisms in the restaurant industry, but also assist in 
supporting existing studies in other contexts. This study will provide practical recommendations 
for restaurant executives to make better-informed decisions regarding implementation of 
internationalization strategies in terms of risk, as well as for investors to estimate better 
investment opportunities based upon the risk features of internationalization.  
This study comes with several limitations since the sample of this study, publicly traded 
U.S. restaurant firms, might constrain the generalizability of the results. In addition, this study 
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examines the risk perspective of internationalization solely in the restaurant industry; therefore, it 
may call for a resurgence of this examination in other hospitality segments such as the hotel and 
casino industries for possible variations across sectors. 
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the 
dissertation, which includes the purpose and the significance of the study. Chapter 2 reviews 
extensive literature on internationalization, risk, and the relationship between internationalization 
and risk. Chapter 3 discusses the data used, methodology employed, and econometrics models to 
test the hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the results. Chapter 5 provides the conclusion of the 
study and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER Π 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of internationalization, risk, and the relationship 
between internationalization and risk. This chapter comprises three sections: 1) 
internationalization; 2) types of risk, including market-based risk and accounting-based risk; and 
3) the relationship between internationalization and risk, based on previous studies.  
Internationalization 
Definition 
Internationalization generally refers to “the outward movement in an individual firm’s or 
larger grouping’s international operations” (Welch & Luostarinen, 1999, p.84). More 
specifically, Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (2007) define international diversification as “a strategy 
through which a firm expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global 
regions and countries into different geographic locations or markets” (p.251). International 
diversification, internationalization, international expansion, geographic diversification, 
globalization, and multinationality can be labeled interchangeably in academic research (Capar 
& Kotabe, 2003; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006). For consistency, the term 
“internationalization” will be applied throughout this study and refers to the expansion into 
international markets.  
Benefits 
The magnitude of internationalization has prompted scholars in the field of financial 
economics and strategy to explore the motives for and persistence of the phenomenon. Through 
international expansion, firms desire to create value by accessing multiple stakeholders, 
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resources, and markets. Internationalization can be a value-adding strategy by both increasing 
firms’ returns and reducing firms’ risk through increased operational flexibility and competitive 
advantages (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993; Lu & Beamish, 2004). Flexibility created from 
exploration of multiple resources enables firms to adjust to market changes (Lu & Beamish, 
2004).  
According to internalization theory and the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Buckley 
& Casson, 1976; Buckley & Strange, 2011; Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 
1997; Tallman & Li, 1996), expanding into global markets can provide domestic firms with 
significant benefits (Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Grant, 1987). The internalization theory proposed 
by Buckley and Casson (1976) focuses on the firm’s bundles of activities and intangible assets. 
Intangible assets such as patents, managerial skills, production skills, marketing abilities, 
consumer goodwill, and research and development (R&D) capability make duplication by 
external parties difficult (Morck & Yeung, 1992; Saudagaran, 2002). Therefore, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) tend to prefer expanding internally and investing directly in international 
markets by setting up subsidiaries over expanding externally by issuing licenses to foreign 
partners. Similarly, according to the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), firms’ intangible assets 
such as knowledge and skills are difficult to sell in the market due to contracting problems 
(Caves, 1982). Thus, firms are more likely to expand their markets to utilize those resources 
rather than sell them.  
Based on internalization theory and the resource-based view above, firms can enjoy 
various benefits, such as economies of scale and scope, by utilizing resources among diverse 
markets (Kogut, 1985; Porter, 1990). Economies of scale and geographic scope can lead firms to 
not only lower costs through arbitrage potential (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003), bargaining 
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power (Sundaram & Black, 1992), and better cross-subsidization (Contractor & Lorange, 2002), 
but also to increase their efficiency through learning and innovation (Kochhar & Hitt, 1995). In 
service markets, MNCs can gain economies of scale throughout the value chain process 
(Dunning, 1989). Additionally, organizational learning theory supports the positive impact of 
internationalization by arguing that firms can gain and apply knowledge and experience from 
foreign markets to improve products, services, and processes (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000), 
although initial costs of such learning may be incurred.  
Finally, risk-reduction can be one of the benefits of internationalization (Cochrane, 
2001). According to modern portfolio theory (Lintner, 1965; Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964), 
diversification enables firms to lessen overall risk by generating a stable return resulting from 
uncorrelated goods (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989), economic conditions (Rugman, 1976), and 
regulations (Caves, 1982). In that regard, MNCs can reduce their risk by diversifying their 
investments across countries (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Hisey & Caves, 1985; Rugman, 1976). 
MNCs with more diversified markets can enjoy greater risk reduction benefits than MNCs with 
domestic markets.   
Stemming from modern portfolio theory, the imperfect capital market theory indicates 
that the market may not be perfectly efficient, and investors may face challenges such as 
information asymmetry. MNCs’ shareholders can enhance their investment value by diversifying 
their portfolios (Doukas & Travlos, 1988). Shapiro (1978) suggests that MNCs generate positive 
cash flows in less than perfectly correlated markets due to the benefits from diversification. 
Moreover, based on the real options theory, MNCs can shift value chain activities to other 
markets when conditions in one market become unfavorable (Buckley & Tse, 1996). In 
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summary, internationalization can enhance firms’ value or reduce their risk through a variety of 
benefits, such as economies of scale and scope, and cost reduction.  
Costs 
However, despite the potential benefits presented above, internationalization may not 
necessarily always create value for firms (Zaheer, 1995) since it can be accompanied by a great 
deal of costs or uncertainty (Hitt et al., 2006). According to organizational evolution theory and 
the contingency theory of complex organization, environmental changes may raise uncertainties, 
increase organizational complexity, or enlarge regulatory compliance requirements, as a firm 
diversifies into various markets (Boyd & Fulk, 1996; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982). Increased 
complexity may substantially drive up, not only the transaction costs (Buckley & Strange, 2011), 
but also monitoring costs for shareholders (Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga, 1996; Saudagaran, 2002).  
According to transaction cost theory, when entering new markets, a firm is likely to be 
exposed to more complicated factors, such as different regulations, cultural diversity, and diverse 
natural environments (Egelhoff, 1982; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994; Jones & Hill, 1988). 
Restaurant literature specifically identifies such factors as unfavorable macro-economic 
conditions, fluctuations in relative values of currencies, political instability, cultural and religious 
differences, and different tax and accounting structure, among other factors (Hua & Upneja, 
2007; Singh, Upneja, & Dalbor, 2004). Managing such factors as firms diversify geographically 
may substantially increase both internal transaction costs, such as information, coordination, and 
motivation costs among multiunit restaurant managers and external transaction costs with 
government officials, suppliers, and customers (Buckley & Strange, 2011; Jang & Tang, 2009).  
Moreover, agency theory postulates that managers may seek their own self-interests at 
the expense of shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (p.5). However, conflicts 
between shareholders (the principals) and managers (the agent) can arise due to outside 
ownership. This separation of ownership and control may result in managers overindulging in 
perquisites, or failing to maximize firm value. Particularly, the agency cost (i.e., costs due to the 
size of divergence) is likely to be aggravated in the presence of free cash flow, namely excessive 
cash flow, in the firm (Jensen, 1986). Managers may pursue unreasonable investments, even 
though the outcome may not necessarily maximize the wealth of shareholders. For instance, 
managers may increase firm size that may result in greater compensation, or adopt strategies that 
may decrease their employment risk. This activity is referred to as an over-investment problem. 
Therefore, the divergence in interests between shareholders and managers, coupled with 
information asymmetry, may reduce MNCs’ value relative to domestic companies’ (DCs’) value 
(Morck & Yeung, 1991). In other words, based on agency theory, a negative effect from 
internationalization might exist since internationalization typically creates more complex 
systems, thereby increasing monitoring costs (Eun et al., 1996; Saudagaran, 2002). 
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Risk  
Definition 
Risk has been a critical variable in numerous strategy studies (Miller & Reuer, 1996). 
Porter (1985) states that “'Risk is a function of how poorly a strategy will perform if the "wrong" 
scenario occurs” (p.476). Miller (1992) specifically refers to risk as “variation in corporate 
outcomes or performance that cannot be forecast ex ante” (p.311). Risk captures the uncertainty, 
the probability distribution, or unpredictability related to the corporate outcome variables 
(Bowman, 1980; Miller, 1992).  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Financial researchers have, in general, utilized CAPM to measure the risk/returns of 
investment (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002). CAPM proposes that the expected return has a positive 
link with market beta which represents systematic or non-diversifiable risk. The expected rate of 
return on a risky asset can be estimated by the risk-free rate plus the risk premium, where the risk 
premium is the excess market return beyond the risk-free rate multiplied by the level of 
systematic risk, as denoted by beta, for the specific investment (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1963, 
1964). The expected rate of return can be delineated as below. 
Ri =Rf +(Rm –Rf)×βi, (1) 
where  
Ri is the expected return on the ith security; 
Rf is the risk-free rate; 
Rm is the return on the market portfolio; 
βi is the estimated beta of the ith security; and   
(Rm –Rf) is the risk premium.  
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Bowman (1979) stated assumptions underlying CAPM as follows: 
1) All investors are single-period, risk-averse maximizers of the expected utility of 
terminal wealth;  
2) Investors find it possible to make their optimal portfolio decisions solely on the basis 
of the mean and standard deviations of the probability distributions of the terminal wealth 
associated with the various portfolios;  
3) All investors have the same decision horizon, and over this period the mean and 
standard deviation of the probability distributions exist;  
4) Investors have homogeneous expectations regarding the mean and standard deviation 
of the probability distributions; and  
5) Capital markets are perfect (p.618).  
CAPM postulates that a firm’s total risk, measured by variance or standard deviation of 
stock return, consists of systematic and unsystematic risk (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1963, 1964). 
Systematic risk represents the stock return volatility caused by market-specific events (Kim et 
al., 2002), or the risk of a stock relative to the risk of the market portfolio (Van Horne, 1998). In 
other words, systematic risk implies how sensitive the firm’s returns are to the market (Olibe, 
Michello, & Thorne, 2008). Market-specific events include recessions, inflation, elections, and 
wars that affect all stocks (Gu & Kim, 2003; Kim et al., 2002). For instance, the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, had a significant impact on 
stock prices across the country (Gu & Kim, 2003). This type of risk is called undiversified or 
market risk (Sharpe, 1963). More specifically, systematic risk is a measure of the slope of a 
regression line between the expected return on the ith security (Ri) and the return on the market 
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portfolio (Rm), including the Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) Stock index or the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) Index.  
Conversely, the unsystematic risk represents the stock return volatility caused by firm-
specific events, and can be reduced and eliminated by portfolio diversification (Brealey, Stewart, 
& Myers, 2000). Firm-specific events include lawsuits, strikes, product defects, resignations of 
company officials, success or failure of marketing programs, gain or loss of contracts, etc., 
(Haugen, 1997). The passing of McDonald’s CEO in 2004, and that of Apple Inc.’s CEO in 2011 
(Bhatnagar, 2004; Griggs, 2011) exemplify firm-specific events. This type of risk is also known 
as diversified, idiosyncratic, unique, and company-specific risk (Sharpe, 1963). Although this 
type of risk can have a significant impact on a single stock’s return, the impact can be reduced 
due to diversification (Gu & Kim, 2003). That is, a decreased stock price caused by firm specific 
events in one stock is likely to be compensated for by gain in another stock, and thus, investors 
need not be compensated for bearing unsystematic risk (Kim et al., 2002). Consequently, the 
unsystematic term does not exist in Equation (1) of CAPM (Gu & Kim, 2003).  
However, CAPM may not be appropriate when measuring a large number of securities, 
since it requires an estimate of the covariances among all pairs of available securities (Haugen, 
1997). Building upon Markowitz’s model (1952), Sharpe (1963) developed a single-factor model 
for portfolio variance which can manage a large population of securities (Kim, Kim, & Gu, 
2012). Based on the single-factor model, the sensitivity of a security’s return to the market 
portfolio’s return, or beta, can be estimated by the characteristic line with historical stock price 
data, as expressed on the following page. 
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Ri = αi + βiRm + ei, (2) 
where,  
Ri is the return on the ith security;  
αi is the estimated vertical intercept; 
βi is the estimated beta of the ith security; or also βi,= Cov (Ri,Rm)/ Var (Rm) 
where  
Cov(Ri,Rm) is the covariance between the stock returns and the market returns;  
Var (Rm) is the variance of the returns on the market; 
Rm is the return on the market portfolio; and  
ei is the error about the regression line that represents the relationship of the two. 
Using the characteristic line shown in Equation (2), the variance of a security’s return, 
namely, total risk, can be divided into two parts, systematic and unsystematic risk (Levy & 
Sarnat, 1984). Taking the variance of both sides of Equation (2), Equation (3), or the single-
factor model equation for the security variance (Haugen, 1997), can be derived as below. 
σi2
 = βi2σm2
 + σe2, (3)  
where, 
σi2
 is the variance of the return on the ith security;  
βi is the beta of the ith stock (or the sensitivity of i’s return to the market return);  
σm2
 is the variance of the market portfolio;  
βi2σm2 measures the stock’s covariance with the market and is thus the volatility due to 
systematic risk; and  
σe2
 
is the variance due to i’s random residual returns, or unsystematic risk.  
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The first term (βi2σm2) on the right-hand side of Equation (3) is the systematic risk of the 
security. In other words, beta is only related to the variance (βi2σm2) with the market. Following 
the single-factor model, beta accounts for the security’s variance which cannot be diversified 
away. The second term (σe2) on the right-hand side of Equation (3) is the unsystematic risk 
which can be measured as the standard deviation of the error term, or the residual of CAPM 
(Fama, 1970).  
The Fama-French Three Factor Model  
CAPM primarily considers market factors to estimate a firm’s stock returns. Yet, 
researchers have found that additional factors can affect the firm’s stock returns (e.g., Banz, 
1981; Fama & French, 1992). Stocks that have lower market capitalization (small stocks) are 
likely to have higher average returns (Banz, 1981). Moreover, value stocks that have high ratios 
of price to a fundamental such as book value or cash flow, have higher average returns than 
growth stocks that have low ratios of price to fundamentals (Fama & French, 1992; Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 1993). Accordingly, the Fama and French three-factor model proposed by Fama and 
French (1993) considers additional factors including size and value versus growth, to capture the 
patterns in U.S. average stock returns (Fama & French, 2012). The Fama and French three-factor 
model is on the following page:  
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Ri - Rf = ai + bi[Rm - Rf] + siSMB + hiHML + ei   (4) 
where,  
Ri is the return on asset i;  
Rf is the risk-free rate; 
Rm is the market return; 
SMB is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of small stocks and 
big stocks; and  
HML is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high book-to-
market (value) stocks and low book-to-market (growth) stocks (Fama & French, 2012, 
p.457).  
The Carhart Four-Factor Model  
The Fama and French three-factor model has been a commonly used measure for 
portfolio performance (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 2010). Fama and French (1993) find that 
the Fama and French three-factor model captures the size and value in U.S. average returns 
better than CAPM. However, the model cannot completely explain average returns (Fama & 
French, 2012). For instance, U.S. stock returns also are found to exhibit momentum, indicating 
that stocks that have performed well in the past year are likely to continue to do so (Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 1993). Both momentum and the value premium (i.e., higher average returns of value 
stocks compared to growth stocks) are found to have an impact on international returns (Chui, 
Titman, & Wei, 2010; Fama & French, 1998). Consequently, based upon the Fama and French 
three-factor model, Carhart (1997) proposes a four-factor model that additionally considers 
momentum for U.S. stock returns (Carhart, 1997; Tuli & Bharadwaj, 2009). The Carhart four-
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factor model has been utilized in recent studies (e.g., Kim & Kim, 2014). The model is shown as 
below.  
Ri - Rf = ai + bi[Rm - Rf] + siSMB + hiHML + wiWML + ei   (5) 
where,  
Ri is the return on asset i; 
Rf is the risk-free rate; 
Rm is the market return; 
SMB is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of small stocks and  
big stocks;  
HML is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high book-to-
market (value) stocks and low book-to-market (growth) stocks; and  
WML is the difference between the month t returns on diversified portfolios of the 
winners and losers of the past year.  
Risk Measures 
For valid measures of strategic risk, the consideration of various stakeholders’ 
perspectives is critical (Chakravarthy, 1986). Different stakeholders may be interested in 
different measures of corporate risk (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Jemison, 1987; Oxelheim & 
Wihlborg, 1987). Investors are likely to be more interested in stock market risk, while managers 
are likely to be more interested in accounting return risk (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Libby & 
Fishburn, 1977).  
Miller and Bromiley (1990) evaluated the most common risk measures employed in 
strategic management research and categorized various firm risk measures into three factors: 1) 
stock returns risk, 2) income stream uncertainty, and 3) strategic risk. Stock returns risk 
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measured systematic and unsystematic risk. Income stream uncertainty included both historical 
returns variability (i.e. the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) and measures derived from 
analysts’ forecasts (i.e. the standard deviation of EPS and coefficient of variation). Strategic risk 
included debt-to-equity ratio, capital intensity, and R&D intensity. The authors suggested that 
various risk factors can generate diverse substantive results.  
In a hospitality context, Lee (2008a) examined various risk measures for lodging firms in 
the following four sections: 1) stock performance risk, 2) performance risk, 3) strategic risk, and 
4) bankruptcy risk. Stock performance risk measures included beta and unsystematic risk. 
Performance risk measures included variations of three ratios: ROA, ROE, and EPS. Two 
measures, debt-to-equity and book-to-market ratios, were examined for strategic risk which 
coincides with the study by Miller and Bromiley (1990). Additionally, bankruptcy risk was 
examined based on a bankruptcy score developed by Ohlson (1980). Lee concluded that stock 
performance and strategic risk factors properly represent the firm’s financial risk in the lodging 
industry.  
Market-Based Risk 
Based upon previous studies, this study intends to examine both market-based risk 
measures and accounting-based risk measures. First, market-based risk measures variability in 
historical stock returns. The two main standard measures for market-based risk are systematic 
and unsystematic risk (Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Miller & Reuer, 1996). As noted, since it is 
assumed that unsystematic risk can be diversified away, prior studies have heavily focused on 
systematic risk. However, measuring risk simply by systematic risk may not be sufficient since 
systematic risk does not consider bankruptcy costs and corporate taxes (Amit & Livnat, 1988).  
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As noted, CAPM assumes that investors find it possible to make their optimal portfolio 
decisions and that capital markets are perfect (Bowman, 1979). In other words, according to 
CAPM’s assumptions, the unsystematic risk is irrelevant in stock pricing only when all of the 
investors include well-diversified portfolios, and capital markets are perfect. However, these 
assumptions may be inappropriate (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987) because, contrary to CAPM, not all 
investors hold diversified stock portfolios, and if investors do not diversify, unsystematic risk 
may play a role in firm valuation (Van Horne, 1998).   
More specifically, Van Horne (1998) contended that, in general, the greater the 
imperfections of capital markets, the more important the unsystematic risk, and that investors are 
likely to consider unsystematic risk due to bankruptcy cost or other costs caused by imperfect 
capital markets. Investors might in turn consider significant bankruptcy costs in imperfect capital 
markets. Thus, unsystematic risk can impact firm value owing to the possible high costs of 
bankruptcy. Moreover, other factors such as transaction costs, costly information, and unequal 
borrowing and lending rates resulting from market imperfections, might, in reality, restrict 
investors from diversifying unsystematic risk. Similarly, other researchers (e.g., Crain, Cudd, & 
Brown, 2000) point out the relevance of unsystematic risk in stock valuation due to a lack of 
well-diversified portfolios and imperfection of capital markets. Non-diversified or less 
diversified investors may need to cope with both unsystematic and systematic risk (Crain et al., 
2000).  
Additionally, this study seeks to investigate downside risk and upside risk. Modern 
portfolio theory measures risk in terms of standard deviation of asset returns, which considers 
risk both negative and positive deviations from expected returns. The negative deviations can be 
considered as “downside risk” and the positive deviations can be considered as “upside risk” 
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(Chong, Jin, & Phillips, 2013). Batur and Choobineh (2010) state that “the downside risk 
involves the probability of obtaining outcomes smaller than a target value, while the upside risk 
involves the probability of obtaining outcomes larger than a target value” (p.2). In other words, 
the downside risk is referred to as a performance that falls below a certain target (Huchzermeier 
& Cohen, 1996), whereas the upside risk is referred to as a performance that falls above a certain 
target. Investors are risk-averse, indicating that investors should avoid downside risk, yet they 
would benefit from upside risk if their investments generate better than expected cash flows, or a 
stock yields higher than average returns (Chong et al., 2013). Nevertheless, this asymmetric view 
on downside risk and upside risk is not reflected by standard deviation of asset returns (Chong et 
al., 2013). 
Accordingly, many researchers (e.g., Belderbos, Tong, & Wu, 2014; Miller & Reuer, 
1998; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000; Tong & Reuer, 2007) have explored multinationality associated 
with downside risk in more depth. Recently, Belderbos et al. (2014) argue that multinationality is 
more likely to decrease downside risk when a firm exploits cross-border opportunities. By 
contrast, multinationality is less likely to decrease downside risk when the firm operates in 
countries with less valuable opportunities such as similar labor cost. Thus, for a thorough 
analysis, the current study expands the examination of downside risk and upside risk.  
Accounting-Based Risk 
Although most previous empirical studies have focused on the effects of 
internationalization on market-based risk, examination of earnings volatility is of significant 
importance to financial managers, investors, and creditors (Krapl, 2015). Unlike market-based 
risk measures which are based on future values, accounting-based risk measures capture historic 
values (Krapl, 2015). Subsequently, accounting-related risk measures can represent operations 
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more directly than market-related risk measures (Bettis & Hall, 1982) and thus are, in general, 
considered to be more relevant to management (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Libby & 
Fishburn, 1977). Profits allow managers to meet multiple stakeholders’ needs by implementing 
diverse corporate strategies, while reduced profits may cause unfavorable managerial decisions, 
such as layoffs, reduced investments, or intensified cost controls (Bromiley, 1986). Moreover, a 
joint analysis of market-based risk and accounting-based risk can be worthwhile because it can 
differentiate between fundamental changes to corporate risk (i.e., accounting-based risk) and 
changes that are subject to market reaction (i.e., market-based risk) (Krapl, 2015). Furthermore, 
earnings volatility may cause unfavorable issue, and thus, higher stock price volatility (Mehdi & 
Seboui, 2011), indicating that earnings volatility can be a good predictor of the systematic risk of 
firms’ securities (Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970).  
Consequently, in conjunction with market-based risk measures, accounting-based risk 
measures are among the most common risk measures employed in strategic management 
research (Miller & Bromiley, 1990). More specifically, the literature on earnings volatility 
associated with internationalization suggests the following two opposite views (El Mehdi, & 
Seboui, 2011). On the one hand, according to the agency conflicts, a firm’s organization 
complexity engendered by internationalization may induce managers to manipulate earnings 
information. On the other hand, according to the earnings volatility hypothesis, 
internationalization tends to alleviate earnings volatility since earnings generated from the firm’s 
diversified markets are less than perfectly correlated (Amihud & Lev, 1981) and accruals from 
various units tend to cancel out; thus, the total accruals at a corporate level are less volatile (El 
Mehdi & Seboui, 2011).  
  23 
In that regard, Rugman (1976) found that internationalization attenuates earnings 
volatility primarily due to firms’ sales generated from imperfectly correlated economies. By 
contrast, examining all firms traded on Nasdaq, Amex, and the NYSE between 1980 and 2011 
based upon CAPM, Krapl (2015) discovered that internationalization increases earnings 
volatility as well as systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk of equity. However, the 
effects of internationalization varied depending on the following measures of 
internationalization: foreign sales ratios, foreign assets ratios, geographical segment data, and 
foreign exchange exposure. Interestingly, internationalization tends to yield risk-reducing effects 
for firms that have higher levels of foreign assets, while it tends to yield risk-increasing effects 
for firms that have higher levels of foreign sales. Therefore, additionally considering accounting-
based risk measures could provide a more complete picture of the internationalization process 
from a risk perspective (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Krapl, 2015). 
Internationalization and Risk 
Negative Relationship 
Researchers have found contradictory results on the effects of internationalization on 
risk: negative, positive, and no relationship (e.g., Al-Obaidan & Scully, 1995; Brewer, 1981; 
Fatemi, 1984; Hughes, Logue, & Sweeney, 1975; Kim et al., 1993; Miller & Pras, 1980; Reeb, 
Kwok, & Baek, 1998; Rugman, 1976; Sledge, 2000). The negative relationship between 
internationalization and firm risk may be explained by modern portfolio theory, which postulates 
that investors can reduce exposure to risk from an individual asset by holding a well-diversified 
portfolio of multiple assets (Lintner 1965; Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe 1964). This theory can be 
applied to the international diversification strategy in that firms can reduce risk by including 
foreign markets in their well-diversified portfolios, rather than depending on a single market’s 
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distress or cyclicality (Kang, Lee, Choi, & Lee, 2012). Additionally, the product life cycle theory 
(Vernon, 1966) suggests that a firm’s stable return can be generated from uncorrelated economic 
conditions (Rugman, 1976), differences in goods (Kim et al., 1989), and political factors across 
diverse markets (Caves, 1982). 
Proponents of internationalization’s risk-reduction effects found that a higher degree of 
internationalization can lower the degree of risk due to the diversification benefits (Agmon & 
Lessard, 1977; Al-Obaidan & Scully, 1995; Hughes et al., 1975; Kim et al., 1993; Miller & Pras, 
1980; Rugman, 1976). More specifically, revenues from international markets can mitigate 
overall cash flow volatility at the corporate level, reducing default risk (Pantzalis, 2001).  
By comparing the returns of 46 MNCs to those of 100 DCs between 1970 and 1973, 
Hughes et al. (1975) found that MNCs have lower systematic risk, lower unsystematic risk, 
lower  total risk,  higher returns, and higher risk-adjusted returns as a result of  lower operating 
risks, higher debt capacity, and operations of economies. The researchers concluded that 
investors perceive that MNCs create substantial diversification benefits. Applying the portfolio 
theory in the international context, Rugman (1976) found that internationalization is adversely 
correlated with variance of profits and that the risk of MNCs is lower than that of DCs. 
Consistent with Hughes et al.(1975) and Rugman (1976), Agmon and Lessard (1977) indicated 
that the betas for portfolios with international operations are much lower and concluded that the 
greater the MNCs’ degree of international operations, the lower the systematic risk.  
Fatemi (1984) compared 84 MNCs and 52 uninational corporations (UNCs) for the 
period of 1971-1980 and found that the monthly betas of the MNCs’ portfolio are significantly 
lower and more stable than those of the UNCs’ portfolio, suggesting that international 
involvement decreases the degree of systematic risk. Shaked (1986) contended that the standard 
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deviation of 125 large manufacturing MNCs’ equity had lower systematic risk, total risk, and 
risk-adjusted performance, but MNCs were significantly more capitalized than DCs. By 
examining the risk-return of 125 U.S. MNCs, Kim et al. (1993) found that as diversification 
endows MNCs with several market bases, global market diversification reduces risk for MNCs. 
Overall, the studies above suggest that a higher degree of international involvement lowers the 
risk.  
Positive Relationship 
Other researchers hold the diametrically opposite view of a positive relationship between 
internationalization and risk. That is, internationalization may escalate risk since firms are 
exposed to increased uncertainty which includes agency problems, fluctuating exchange rates, 
institutional risk, etc. (Reeb et al., 1998). Since both the operating and financing risk affect a 
firm, investing in a diversified firm might not be a suitable option in terms of portfolio 
diversification (Jacquillat & Solnik, 1978). Although internationalization decreases financial 
risk, measured by variation in earnings, it increases operational risk due to augmented 
complexities in operation of dispersed organizations (Liang & Rhoades, 1988).  
This argument may be attributed to agency theory which argues that managers may act 
for their own self-interest rather than for shareholders' interests (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). According to the agency models of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen 
(1986), conflicts between managers and stockholders may exist. As corporate structure becomes 
more complex, it would be more difficult for shareholders to monitor managers’ management 
activities to align with the shareholders’ interest. Since MNCs are generally more complex to 
operate, managers might favor international diversification (Morck & Yeung, 1991). Divergence 
in interests between these two parties can create more complex issues (Saudagaran, 2002). Thus, 
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internationalization may drive up agency costs of debt resulting from higher monitoring costs 
and auditing costs, coupled with different languages, legal systems, and asset structures in 
imperfect capital markets (Burgman, 1996; Lee & Kwok, 1988).    
In a similar vein, the transaction cost theory posits that as a firm enters new markets, it is 
likely to be exposed to more complicated factors. Transaction cost theory has been considered in 
evaluating the control of MNCs on their foreign subsidiaries through the use of equity structure 
(Gatignon & Anderson, 1988) and vertical integration (Dunning, 1988). Thus, these increased 
transaction costs may impede investors from completely diversifying business risk 
(Constantinides, 1986).  
Providing the evidence of higher discount rates in evaluating international operations, 
Reeb et al. (1998) demonstrated that MNCs can augment risk due to various risk factors such as 
agency issues, asymmetric information, exchange rate risk, political risk, etc., thereby offsetting 
the diversification benefits. A firm may undertake unnecessary risk and overlook problems 
caused by internationalization (Chong, 1991). Demsetz and Strahan (1997) revealed that a higher 
degree of internationalization in large bank holding companies did not lower risk since 
diversification may render firms to pursue riskier activities and raise leverage. Cheng and Roulac 
(2007) found that as the degree of internationalization increased, marginal risk reduction 
decreased, and suggested that the effect of internationalization on risk should not be 
overestimated.  
No Relationship 
Finally, some researchers have found a non-significant relationship between 
internationalization and firm risk. For instance, finding limited impact of foreign operations on 
the systematic risk measures of U.S. MNCs, Jacquillat and Solnik (1978) contended that if a 
  27 
MNC share is indeed like an international portfolio, the stock price should be affected by factors 
to the extent of its activity abroad. In a study of monthly returns and the value-weighted NYSE 
Index of 151 MNCs and 137 DCs during the period of 1963-1975, Brewer (1981) also found no 
significant difference in risk, measured by the intercept and slope of the security market line. 
Despite an attempt to examine the nonlinear relationship between the degree of 
internationalization and the betas, Fatemi (1984) found insufficient evidence to conclude that the 
relationship is nonlinear. Similarly, Sledge (2000) attempted to examine a U-shaped curved line 
between international diversification and risk; however, the curve was not observed.  
Even though substantial studies on the effect of internationalization on a firm’s risk have 
revealed mixed findings, the majority of literature has yielded significant relationships in either a 
negative or positive manner as noted. In a similar vein, hospitality studies imply that 
internationalization can be one of the factors that affect the quality of the hotel Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REIT) (Simonoff & Baig, 1997) and can increase average costs of REIT 
(Bers & Springer, 1997).   
Hypotheses 
Therefore, this dissertation argues for significant effects of internationalization on a 
restaurant firm’s risk measures and proposes the following hypotheses. 
H1: The degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the 
firm’s systematic risk.  
H2: The degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the 
firm’s unsystematic risk.  
H3: The degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the 
firm’s ROA risk.  
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H4: The degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the 
firm’s ROE risk.  
H5: The degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the 
firm’s EPS risk.  
Conclusion 
This chapter reviews related extant literature on 1) costs and benefits of 
internationalization; 2) various risk measures, including systematic, unsystematic, and 
accounting risk; and 3) contradictory results on the relationship between internationalization and 
risk as being negative, positive, or no relationship. This study intends to investigate potential 
effects of U.S. restaurant firms’ internationalization on firm risk. The next chapter will discuss 
the methodology employed in this study.  
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The methodology chapter consists of three main sections: 1) data collection; 2) 
description of dependent, independent, and control variables; and 3) models/method to examine 
the relationship between internationalization and risk in the restaurant industry.  
Data Collection 
This study identifies publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms using the standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code of 5812, and utilizes four resources to collect data: 1) COMPUSTAT, 
2) annual financial reports (10-Ks), 3) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and 4) 
the Fama-French Portfolios. This dissertation utilizes COMPUSTAT to retrieve annual financial 
data including total assets and total revenues, and 10-Ks for the number of 
domestic/international/total units. For estimation of restaurant firms’ systematic, and 
unsystematic risk, both the CRSP for restaurant firms’ daily returns and the Fama-French 
portfolios for four factor resources (i.e., excess return on the market, small-minus-big return, 
high-minus-low return, momentum, and risk-free return rate (one month treasury bill rate)) were 
utilized. The sample period spans 2000 to 2013 due to very limited availability of restaurant 
firms’ internationalization information prior to 2000 and the unavailability of 10-Ks in 2014 
when initiating this study. To examine potential variations between the two data sets, the current 
study divided the data into two categories: 1) the first category spans all the U.S. based restaurant 
firms included in COMPUSTAT (hereafter referred to as all the U.S. restaurant firms) and 2) the 
second category only spans U.S. based restaurant firms, taken from the first category, which 
report their number of international operations to be more than or equal to one unit (hereafter 
referred to as U.S. restaurant firms with international operations). The number of observations 
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from 179 firms for all the U.S. restaurant firms varies from 642 to 930 depending on various risk 
measures, while the number of observations from 120 firms for U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations only ranges from 276 to 338 depending on those risk measures.  
Dependent Variables 
Based upon previous studies on risk measures, this dissertation utilizes two avenues of 
risk measures: 1) market-based risk (i.e., systematic and unsystematic risk), and 2) accounting-
based risk (i.e., the standard deviation of ROA, ROE, and EPS), to examine the effect of 
internationalization on restaurant firms’ risk. Following earlier approaches to risk in finance and 
strategic management literature (e.g., Lee, 2008a; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Shaked, 1986), this 
study uses the standard deviation as a proxy for risk since it is a commonly used measure of 
dispersion and, therefore, risk (Bettis & Hall, 1982).  
The estimation of the systematic and unsystematic risk in this study is based upon the 
Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) which stems from the Fama-French three-factor 
model. Unlike CAPM that considers market factors only to estimate a firm’s stock returns, the 
Carhart four-factor model takes into account size, value, growth, and  momentum for U.S. 
average stock returns (Carhart, 1997). The revised model by Carhart used in this dissertation is 
as follows:  
Rid - Rfd = σid + β1i[Rmd - Rfd] + β2iSMBd + β3iHMLd + β4iUMDd + eid  (6) 
where,  
i is the firm and d is day 
Rid is the return on asset of firm i at day d,  
Rfd is the risk-free rate at day d, 
Rmd is the return on a value-weighted market portfolio at day d,  
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SMBd is the difference between the stock returns on the value-weighted portfolios of 
small stocks and big stocks for day d,  
HMLd is the difference between the stock returns on the value-weighted portfolios of 
high book-to-market (value) stocks and low book-to-market (growth) stocks for day d,   
UMDd is the difference between the average return of two high prior return portfolios and 
two low prior return portfolios for day d, and 
eid is the error terms (Fama & French, 2012; Kim & Kim, 2014).  
Market-Based Risk: Systematic Risk and Unsystematic Risk 
To estimate firm i’s systematic and unsystematic risk in year t, the daily stock returns of 
all the restaurants included in the sample were retrieved from the CRSP database. These returns 
were then regressed against the daily returns for the entire market and the three additional factors 
included in Equation (6). For each firm in each year between 2000 and 2013, the estimated 
coefficient for market return (Rmd - Rfd) in Equation (6) was considered as systematic risk (SR) 
of firm i in year t (Kim & Kim, 2014; Tuli & Bharadwaj, 2009). Unsystematic risk (UR) was 
measured by the standard deviation of estimated residuals (^eid) for the error term (eid) in 
Equation (6) (Kim & Kim, 2014; Tuli & Bharadwaj, 2009).  
This dissertation expands the market-based risk analysis (i.e., systematic and 
unsystematic risk) to downside risk and upside risk more in depth. In other words, systematic 
risk has been examined in three different ways: 1) systematic risk, 2) downside systematic risk, 
and 3) upside systematic risk. Likewise, unsystematic risk has been examined in three different 
ways: 1) unsystematic risk, 2) downside unsystematic risk, and 3) upside unsystematic risk for a 
thorough analysis. Downside risk was measured by regressing against the daily returns less than 
the mean value of returns for each year, which served as the target level, whereas upside risk was 
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measured by regressing against the daily returns greater than the mean value of returns for each 
year.  
Accounting-Based Risk: ROA Risk, ROE Risk, and EPS Risk 
Accounting-based risk has been estimated by the variance of returns (e.g., Bettis & Hall, 
1982; Bowman, 1980, Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986, 1988). Variations of ROA, ROE, and EPS, 
among other returns, have been applied as risk measures (Bowman, 1980; Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1986, 1988; Milller & Bromiley, 1990; Lee, 2008a). Following accepted practice, this 
study includes the standard deviation of ROA, ROE, and EPS for the last five years as proxies 
for variation of returns (Dichev & Tang, 2009).  
ROA has been widely utilized as a proxy for the accounting measures in international 
business research (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Bettis & Hall, 1982; Bettis & Mahajan, 1985) since it 
can control for different financial structures across firms and focuses on the relative efficiency 
with which the resources available have been utilized. Similarly, ROE has been employed for 
return stability analysis (Milller & Bromiley, 1990; Lee, 2008a). Additionally, EPS can be a 
proxy for the uncertainty associated with the firm’s future income stream (Miller & Bromiley, 
1990) and have been examined in previous studies (Bromiley, 1991; Conroy & Harris, 1987; 
Imhoff & Lobo, 1987; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Lee, 2008a).  
  
  33 
Main Independent Variable of Interest 
The degree of internationalization (DOI) is employed as a proxy for internationalization 
as an independent variable in this study. Measurements of the DOI of a firm, as suggested by 
previous literature, include three attributes: structural (what resources are overseas) (Stopford & 
Wells, 1972), performance (what happens overseas) (Vernon, 1971), and attitudinal (what is top 
management's international orientation) (Perlmutter, 1969). DOI is measured by ratios because it 
is not an absolute state but a relative proportion to domestic situation (Forsgren, 1989; Welch & 
Luostarinen, 1988). The structural attribute measures DOI using the number of international 
subsidiaries (Stopford & Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1971). Variability in the breadth and depth of 
subsidiaries among MNCs prompted previous studies to standardize overseas operation measure 
by the number of foreign subsidiaries scaled by the total number of operating subsidiaries 
(Sullivan, 1994). Since the purpose of this study is to explore a strategic risk perspective of 
internationalization, this study employs the structural attribute, or the ratio of the number of 
foreign properties to the number of total properties to measure firms’ DOI. Hospitality literature 
has similarly utilized the ratio of the number of foreign properties to the number of total 
properties as a measure of restaurant and hotel firms’ international involvement (Koh, Lee, & 
Boo, 2009; Lee, 2008b).  
Control Variables 
Several financial variables have been found to impact a firm’s risk (Breen & Lerner, 
1973; Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 2002; Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002; Lev & Kunitzky, 1974; Logue 
& Merville, 1972; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987; Miller & Bromiley, 
1990). This study employs seven variables as control variables: 1) firm size, 2) leverage, 3) 
liquidity, 4) profitability, 5) operating efficiency, 6) growth, and 7) dividend payout ratio, based 
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on the previous studies (Gu & Kim, 2002, 2003; Hsu & Jang, 2008; Kim et al., 2002; Kim, Kim, 
& Gu, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2007; Rugman, 1976).   
Firm Size 
First, firm size (SIZE) is employed to control for its confounding effect as larger firms 
are expected to decrease their risk by diversifying their operations, customers, and services 
(Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Liang & Rhoades, 1988; Miller & Pras, 1980; Rugman, 1976) or by 
mitigating the impact of economic, social, and political changes on their firms (Sullivan, 1978). 
Large firms are likely to lower cost, be more stable, and be profitable from the benefits of 
economies of scale via diversification, thereby leading to be less chance of default and risky 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991). In addition, large firms’ securities can be quickly converted into cash, 
thereby indicating that they can be less risky (Fisher, 1959). Several empirical studies have 
confirmed the negative relationship of firm size to risk (Kim et al., 2002; Lev & Kunitzky, 1974; 
Logue & Merville, 1972). Consistent with previous studies, this study uses log of total revenues 
as a proxy for a firm’s size (e.g., Gu & Kim, 2002; Lee & Jang, 2007). 
Leverage 
Second, leverage (LEV) is employed to control for capital structure as diversification can 
be encouraged by or related to high financial leverage (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). A firm’s 
financial leverage can represent its risk of bankruptcy (Hurdle, 1974; Shapiro & Titman, 1986). 
Based on the trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), a firm’s leverage accrues tax 
benefits to a certain extent, while too high leverage ratio tends to induce higher risk (Kwok & 
Rebb, 2000; Van Horne, 1998). High leverage generally makes firms more susceptible to 
financial risk; hence, a firm’s financial leverage is known to relate positively to risk (Amit & 
Livnat, 1988; Borde, 1998; Bowman, 1979; Kim et al., 2002; Logue & Merville 1972; 
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Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Moyer & Chartfield, 1983). Likewise, hospitality studies have 
empirically confirmed a positive relationship between leverage and risk (Gu & Kim 2003; Hsu & 
Jang 2008; Kim, Ryan, & Ceschini, 2007). In this study, LEV is measured by the ratio of total 
debt to total assets (e.g., Amit & Livnat, 1988; Lee & Jang, 2007).   
Liquidity 
Third, liquidity (LIQ) is included as it can be associated with the degree of diversification 
(Chartterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Jensen (1986) suggests that liquidity is positively related to 
risk because high liquidity could increase agency costs of free cash flow due to moral hazard and 
thus induce unreasonable investments. In contrast, other studies have shown the negative 
relationship between liquidity and risk since high liquidity fulfills short-term cash needs and 
alleviates financial risk (Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970; Logue & Merville, 1972; Moyer & 
Chatfield, 1983). Hospitality literature also views liquidity as one of the potential critical 
determinants of risk (Borde 1998; Gu & Kim, 2003; Kim, Ryan, & Ceschini, 2007; Lee & 
Jang, 2007). In this study, LIQ is measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities). 
Profitability  
Fourth, profitability (PRO) is included as it can be correlated with diversification and risk 
concurrently (Barton, 1988). Profitability generally improves firms’ financial stability while 
decreasing risk (Logue & Merville 1972). Hospitality literature has found that profitability 
reduced systematic risk in restaurant firms (Borde, 1998; Kim et al. 2007) and airlines (Lee & 
Jang 2007), and reduced unsystematic risk in restaurant and hotel firms (Hsu & Jang 2008). On 
the other hand, profitable firms can often employ aggressive business strategies and thus exhibit 
higher risk (Borde, 1998; Borde, Chambliss, & Madura, 1994), as demonstrated in the hotel (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2002) and insurance firms (e.g., Borde et al., 1994), suggesting that firms can  more 
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profitable when taking more risk. In this study, profitability is measured by the return on assets 
(ROA: net income to total assets) (e.g., Lee & Jang, 2007).  
Operating Efficiency 
Fifth, operating efficiency (EF) is included as it can be negatively associated with risk 
(Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 2002; Logue & Merville, 1972). If firms efficiently utilize their assets 
in generating revenues, they are likely to generate higher profits and to have a negative 
relationship with risk (Kim et al., 2002; Lee & Jang, 2007). Gu and Kim (1998) examined 35 
casino firms and found that higher operating efficiency leads to lower systematic risk. Operating 
efficiency is measured by the ratio of total revenue to total assets (e.g., Kim et al., 2002).  
Growth 
Sixth, growth (GW) is included since high growth tends to increase firms’ risk.  Firms 
with higher growth may need more resources (Roh, 2002) which, in turn, cause the firms to look 
for outside financing and to invest time and money in human resource training and education. 
This internal adjustment costs lead firms to high leverage.  In this regard, growth is positively 
related to risk.  Nevertheless, firms with high growth rates in earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) can usually keep high stock prices due to the anticipated high earnings, whereas the stock 
prices of companies with low growth rates may be much more volatile (Borde, 1998).  This study 
uses EBIT growth (annual percentage change in EBIT) as a proxy for growth.  
Dividend Payout Ratio 
Finally, dividend payout ratio (DIV) is included since high dividend payout may reduce 
risk (Logue & Merville, 1972; Moyer & Chatfield, 1983; Rosenberg & McKibben, 1973). Since 
high dividend payout ratio can reflect firms’ confidence in their current position and in the 
stability of future earnings, dividends can help settle uncertainty as to firms’ future returns 
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(Moyer & Chatfield, 1983). Investors consider dividend returns to be more secure than stock 
returns; thus, firms with high dividend payments are expected to mitigate systematic risk (Logue 
& Merville, 1972). This study uses dividend payout ratio, measured by a ratio of dividends per 
common share to earnings per share, which indicate the proportion of current earnings, per 
common share, paid out as dividends (e.g., Kim et al., 2012). 
Models 
The following models assess market-based risk for linear, nonlinear, lagged, and lagged 
non-linear effects, respectively. The models are shown below: 
1. Market-based risk  
1.1. Systematic risk 
[1.1.a] SRt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ 
α8DIVt + εi        
[1.1.b] SRt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + α9DIVt + εt   
[1.1.c] SRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+  
α8DIVt + εi         
[1.1.d] SRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + 
α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
1.2. Downside systematic risk 
[1.2.a] DSRt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ 
α8DIVt + εi        
[1.2.b] DSRt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + α9DIVt + εt   
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[1.2.c] DSRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  
+ α8DIVt + εi         
[1.2.d] DSRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + 
α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
1.3. Upside systematic risk 
[1.3.a] USRt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ 
α8DIVt + εi        
[1.3.b] USRt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + α9DIVt + εt   
[1.3.c] USRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  
+ α8DIVt + εi         
[1.3.d] USRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + 
α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
1.4. Unsystematic risk 
[1.4.a] URt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt + 
α8DIVt + εt   
[1.4.b] URt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + α9DIVt + εt   
[1.4.c] URt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+  
α8DIVt + εi        
[1.4.d] URt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt +  
α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
1.5. Downside unsystematic risk 
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[1.5.a] DURt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt + 
α8DIVt + εt   
[1.5.b] DURt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + α9DIVt + εt   
[1.5.c] DURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt +  
α7GWt + α8DIVt + εi        
[1.5.d] DURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt  
+ α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
1.6. Upside unsystematic risk 
[1.6.a] UURt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt + 
α8DIVt + εt   
[1.6.b] UURt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + α9DIVt + εt   
[1.6.c] UURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt +  
α7GWt + α8DIVt + εi        
[1.6.d] UURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt  
+ α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
The next models assess accounting-based risk for linear, nonlinear, lagged, and lagged 
non-linear effects, respectively. The models are shown on the following pages: 
2. Accounting-based risk  
2.1. ROA risk 
[2.1.a] SROAt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + 
εi    
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[2.1.b] SROAt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + εi    
[2.1.c] SROAt = α0 + α1LagDOIt -1+ α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + 
α7GWt  + εi    
[2.1.d] SROAt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt 
+ α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi    
2.2. ROE risk 
[2.2.a] SROEt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + 
εi    
[2.2.b] SROEt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + εi    
[2.2.c] SROEt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + 
α7GWt  +εi    
[2.2.d] SROEt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt 
+ α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi    
2.3. EPS risk 
[2.3.a] SEPSt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
[2.3.b] SEPSt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + 
α8GWt + εi    
[2.3.c] SEPSt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + 
α7GWt  +εi    
[2.3.d] SEPSt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt 
+ α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi       
  41 
The dependent variables employed in the models are defined as follows:    
 SR = a firm’s market-based risk, measured by systematic risk;  
o DSR = a firm's downside systematic risk; 
o USR = a firm's upside systematic risk; 
 UR = a firm’s market-based risk, measured by unsystematic risk; 
o DUR = a firm's downside unsystematic risk; 
o UUR = a firm's upside unsystematic risk; 
 SROA = a firm’s accounting-based risk, measured by the standard deviation of return 
on assets (ROA = net income/total assets) for the last five years; 
 SROE = a firm’s accounting-based risk, measured by the standard deviation of return 
on equity (ROE = net income/total equity, where equity is denoted by total book-
value of equity) for the last five years; and 
 SEPS = a firm’s accounting-based risk, measured by the standard deviation of 
earnings per share (EPS) for the last five years. 
The independent variable employed in the models is defined as follows: 
 DOI = the degree of internationalization, measured by total number of foreign 
units/total number of units; 
 DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; 
 LagDOI = the degree of internationalization, measured by total number of foreign 
units/total number of units at t-1; and  
 LagDOI2 = the squared form of LagDOI. 
The control variables employed in the models are defined as follows: 
 SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues;  
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 LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; 
 LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); 
 PRO = a firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); 
 EF = a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by the asset turnover ratio 
(total revenues/total assets); 
 GW = a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT); 
 DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common        
share/earnings per share; and  
 εi = the error terms. 
Methods 
To examine the relationship between internationalization and restaurant firms’ risk, this 
study performed panel regression analysis of two-way fixed-effects models or two-way random-
effects models to account for unobserved effects. Panel data can offer a solution to potential bias 
problems caused by unobserved heterogeneity, a common issue in model fitting with cross-
sectional data sets. Panel data sets may enable researchers to increase the sample size, to conduct 
more complicated models, and to reveal dynamics that are difficult to detect with cross-sectional 
data (Gujarati, 2003). The pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation may not control 
omitted variable bias from unobservable time (firm)-invariant firm (time) specific effects of 
panel data (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). This study performs either fixed-effects 
regressions or random-effects regressions which are known as the two main approaches to model 
fitting. This study conducts the Hausman test to determine an appropriate model between fixed-
effects models and random-effects models (Greene, 2003).  
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Conclusion 
This chapter delineates 1) data collection, 2) the variables employed in this study, and 3) 
models/method. This study examines publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms during the period of 
2000 through 2013 using a panel dataset. This study categorizes the dependent variables into two 
segments: market-based risk and accounting-based risk. Market-based risk includes systematic 
risk and unsystematic risk. Accounting-based risk includes standard deviation of ROA, ROE, 
and EPS. The main independent variable of interest is DOI. The seven control variables are size, 
leverage, liquidity, profitability, operating efficiency, growth, and dividend payout ratio, based 
on related literature. The next chapter will discuss the results of the study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analyses performed. First, the 
descriptive statistics of the indicators for 17 variables including nine risk measures (i.e., 
systematic risk, unsystematic risk, downside systematic risk, downside unsystematic risk, upside 
systematic risk, upside unsystematic risk, standard deviation of ROA, standard deviation of 
ROE, and standard deviation of EPS), one primary independent variable (i.e. the degree of 
internationalization), and seven control variables (i.e., firm size, leverage, liquidity, profitability, 
operating efficiency, growth, and dividend payout ratio) are presented. Second, the Pearson’s 
correlation analyses for the bivariate correlations among all study variables are presented. 
Finally, the results of the linear effects, non-linear effects, and lagged effects of 
internationalization on nine risk measures are presented.  
Preliminary Analysis and Assumption Check 
To examine the effect of internationalization on firms’ risk, this study employs panel 
regression analysis using panel data of the sampled restaurant firms over the period between 
2000 and 2013. A panel data set encompasses both cross-sectional and time series dimensions; 
that is, it can show not only the cross-sectional differences between subjects, but also the time-
series changes within subjects over time (Gujarati, 2003). Baltagi (2005) and Hsiao (1986) imply 
that panel data methodology can control for each firm’s heterogeneity, reduce multicollinearity-
linked problems as well as estimation bias, and specify the time-varying relationship between 
dependent and independent variables.  
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Before completing the main analysis, this study implemented several steps to ensure the 
validity of the econometric specification and related assumptions underlying the statistical 
models. This dissertation checked for outliers based on the criteria of an absolute value of 
studentized residual of 4 (Younger, 1979), identified and removed them for each analysis. The 
number of outliers removed from the data ranges from one to five for the analyses using all the 
U.S. restaurant firms (i.e., both cases with domestic operations only, and domestic and 
international operations). For instance, the number of outliers removed for the unsystematic risk 
model was one whereas the number of outliers removed for all three accounting-based risk 
models including ROA risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk were five. On the other hand, the number of 
outliers removed from the data ranges from zero to four for the U.S. restaurant firms with both 
domestic and international operations (excluding the restaurant firms with only domestic 
operations). Specifically, the number of outliers removed for the systematic risk model was zero 
while the number of outliers removed for the EPS risk model was four. These numbers of 
outliers seem to be not large enough to cause any significant problems.  
To check the normality assumption, this study conducted Shapiro-Wilk W tests, which is 
considered to be a more accurate test than other normality tests including the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test (Field, 2005). The maximum p-value of the test is less than 0.00170, rejecting the 
null hypothesis of normality. In other words, residuals of the regression analysis are not normally 
distributed. Nevertheless, firms’ financial variables are seldom distributed normally (Barnes, 
1987) and the variables included in this study were no exception. Moreover, when the sample 
size is large enough, the normality assumption can be relaxed based upon the central limit 
theorem (Rice, 2007). More specifically, Good (1992) indicates that the sample size of 100 or 
more is acceptable as the criteria of thumb to relax the normality assumption. Since the sample 
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size in this study ranges from 276 to 930 depending on risk measures, the normality assumption 
can be reasonably relaxed.   
Furthermore, this study analyzed variance inflation factors (VIF) for each model to 
identify the presence of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity causes issues such as shared variance 
between variables, thus decreasing the ability to predict the dependent variable and to identify 
the relative effects of each independent variable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). All 
VIF values in this study fall within 10: a generally accepted cut-off value of multicollinearity 
suggested by previous literature (e.g., Hair et al., 2010; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2005; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Thus, the multicollinearity issue may not be a concern.  
This study additionally performed Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to examine 
whether homoscedasticity assumption is violated or not. This dissertation ran the 
homoscedasticity test on all 72 models of two dataset (i.e., 1) All the U.S. restaurants and 2) U.S. 
restaurant firms with international operations). Overall, according to test results, the models with 
only systematic risk and standard deviation of ROA as dependent variable do not violate 
homoscedasticity assumption while the other three models (with unsystematic risk, standard 
deviation of ROE, and standard deviation of EPS) violate the assumption. For example, U.S. 
restaurant firms with international operations present the following detailed results for lagged 
effects; the model with systematic risk as dependent variable (DV) shows a chi-square value 
of .01 (p-value = .94); the model with unsystematic risk as DV shows a chi-square value of 
122.83 (p-value < .01); the model with standard deviation (SD) of ROA shows a chi-square 
value of 2.51 (p-value = .1128); the model with SD of ROE shows a chi-square value of 973.55 
(p-value < .01); and the model with SD of EPS shows a chi-square value of 431.19 (p-value 
< .01). Interestingly, all significant findings except one are from the models with systematic risk 
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and standard deviation of ROA as dependent variables where the homoscedasticity assumption is 
satisfied. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for each variable included in analyses for all the 
U.S. restaurant firms. Systematic risk (SR) for the sampled restaurant companies shows a mean 
value of 0.71 with a range of -1.11 to 2.41. A beta of more than 1.0 represents a riskier portfolio 
than the market portfolio, and vice versa. In other words, the mean of systematic risk of the 
restaurant firms for all the U.S. restaurant firms is lower than the market portfolio of 1.0, 
indicating that the stocks of publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms are considered less risky to 
investors compared to the market. Unsystematic risk (UR) has a mean value of 0.03 with a 
minimum value of 0.01 and a maximum value of 0.20. The degree of internationalization (DOI) 
variable has a mean value of 0.07, ranging from 0 to 0.97, indicating that the sample includes 
both domestic operations (minimum value of 0) and international operations (maximum value of 
0.97).   
Firm leverage ratio (LEV) shows a mean value of 0.65 with a minimum (maximum) 
value of 0 (10.20) and the mean of firm liquidity (LIQ) is 1.03 with a minimum (maximum) 
value of 0.04 (10.90). The mean of operating efficiency (EF) is 1.65 with a minimum 
(maximum) value of 0.05 (5.28) and the mean of growth (GW) is -0.60 with a minimum 
(maximum) value of -572 (45.01). The mean of dividend payout ratio (DIV) is 0.14 with a 
minimum (maximum) value of -39.66 (39.63). Total revenues span $ 0.28 million to $28,105 
million with a mean value of $1,233 million. Total assets vary from $0.35 million to $36,626 
million with a mean value of $1,091 million.    
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Table 1   
Descriptive statistics for All the U.S. restaurant firms  
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
SR 645 0.71 0.47 -1.11 2.41 
UR 647 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.20 
DSR 646 0.34 0.34 -1.13 1.44 
DUR 642 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 
USR 643 0.30 0.44 -1.87 2.63 
UUR 643 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13 
SROA 918 0.09 0.35 0.00 6.04 
SROE 918 0.66 2.51 0.00 40.83 
SEPS 930 0.90 2.22 0.00 38.11 
DOI 930 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.97 
SIZE 930 2.46 0.80 -0.55 4.45 
LEV 930 0.65 0.59 0.00 10.20 
LIQ 930 1.03 0.95 0.04 10.90 
PRO 930 0.01 0.21 -2.17 1.65 
EF 930 1.65 0.73 0.05 5.28 
GW 930 -0.60 19.06 -572.00 45.01 
DIV 647 0.14 2.55 -39.66 39.63 
TR 930 1233.39 3121.92 0.28 28105.70 
TA 930 1091.50 3712.49 0.35 36626.30 
Note. Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; SROA = standard deviation of 
return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of return on equity (net income/total equity); 
SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of internationalization, measured by the number of 
foreign units/total units; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, 
measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current 
liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s 
operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured 
by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes (EBIT); DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by 
dividends per common share/earnings per share; TR = total revenues; and TA = total assets.  
 
Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics analysis for each variable for U.S. 
restaurant firms with international operations for the observations of the same period. Systematic 
risk (SR) for the sampled restaurant companies shows a mean value of 0.85 with a range of -0.55 
to 2.16. The mean of systematic risk of the restaurant companies in U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations is still lower than the market portfolio of 1.0, indicating that the stocks 
of publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms in this sample are considered less risky to investors 
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compared to the market. Unsystematic risk (UR) has a mean value of 0.02 with a minimum value 
of 0.01 and a maximum value of 0.13. The degree of internationalization (DOI) variable shows a 
mean value of 0.20, ranging from 0.00 to 0.97, indicating that the sample includes international 
operations with value greater than 0. Originally, the minimum value of DOI is 0.001947; 
however, due to the rounding, it shows the minimum value of 0.00 in Table 2. 
The average values of firm leverage ratio (LEV), liquidity (LIQ), profitability (PRO), and 
growth (GW) are 0.67, 1.12, 0.55, and -0.04, respectively, which are higher than the mean values 
of these variables for all the U.S. restaurant firms. On the other hand, the average values of 
operating efficiency (EF) and dividend payout ratio (DIV) are 1.52 and 0.08, respectively, which 
are slightly lower than those for all the U.S. restaurant firms. Total revenues and total assets 
show mean values of $2,658 million and $2,518 million, respectively, which are higher than the 
mean values of those for all the U.S. restaurant firms. Compared to all the U.S. restaurant firms, 
U.S. restaurant firms with international operations overall show higher mean values for each 
variable.       
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
SR 277 0.85 0.37 -0.55 2.16 
UR 276 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13 
DSR 276 0.44 0.27 -0.41 1.23 
DUR 276 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 
USR 276 0.38 0.30 -0.56 1.67 
UUR 276 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 
SROA 331 0.06 0.09 0.00 1.12 
SROE 330 0.51 1.14 0.00 8.86 
SEPS 338 0.78 0.92 0.02 6.46 
DOI 338 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.97 
SIZE 338 2.93 0.69 0.74 4.45 
LEV 338 0.67 0.56 0.00 4.07 
LIQ 338 1.12 0.90 0.10 6.12 
PRO 338 0.55 0.11 -0.60 0.41 
EF 338 1.52 0.72 0.08 4.62 
GW 338 -0.04 2.56 -35.50 14.76 
DIV 277 0.08 2.96 -39.66 23.68 
TR 338 2657.71 4805.28 5.53 28105.70 
TA 338 2517.90 5877.96 13.94 36626.30 
Note. Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; SROA = standard deviation of 
return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of return on equity (net income/total equity); 
SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of internationalization, measured by the number of 
foreign units/total units; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, 
measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current 
liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s 
operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured 
by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes (EBIT); DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by 
dividends per common share/earnings per share; TR = total revenues; and TA = total assets.  
 
Pearson’s Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 presents the Pearson’s correlation analysis for the bivariate correlations among 
all variables in this study for all the U.S. restaurant firms. SR positively and significantly 
correlates with SIZE (r = 0.44) and PRO (r = 0.11) while negatively correlating with EF (r = -
0.14). UR negatively correlates with DOI (r = -0.11), SIZE (r = -0.18), and PRO (r = - 0.26) at 
the significance level of 0.01. SROA negatively correlates with SIZE (r = -0.28) and PRO (r = -
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0.58), but positively correlates with LEV (r = 0.11) and EF (r = 0.28). DOI positively and 
significantly correlates with SIZE (r = 0.47), LEV (r = 0.23), LIQ (r = 0.12), and PRO (r = 0.25).  
Table 3  
Pearson’s correlation for All the U.S. restaurant firms 
Note. Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; SROA = standard deviation of 
return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of return on equity (net income/total equity); 
SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of internationalization, measured by the number of 
foreign units/total units; DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; LagDOI = degree of internationalization, measured by the 
number of foreign units/total units at t-1; LagDOI2 = the squared form of LagDOI; SIZE = a firm size, measured by 
log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes 
(EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
 
V DOI DOI2 LagDOI LagDOI2 SIZE LEV LIQ PRO EF GW DIV 
SR  0.05  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.44  0.83 -0.06  0.11 -0.14  0.03 -0.00 
  0.23  0.92  0.29  0.97  0.00***  0.25  0.11  0.01***  0.00***  0.52  0.99 
UR -0.11 
 0.01** 
-0.09 
 0.03** 
-0.12 
 0.01** 
-0.09 
 0.02** 
-0.18 
 0.00*** 
 0.26 
 0.31 
-0.10 
 0.01** 
-0.26 
 0.00*** 
 0.10 
 0.02** 
-0.03 
 0.49 
-0.00 
 0.98 
DSR  0.07  0.03  0.07  0.03  0.33  0.03  0.02  0.16 -0.16  0.05  0.00 
  0.10  0.47  0.11  0.49  0.00***  0.44  0.71  0.00***  0.00***  0.20  0.93 
DUR -0.23 -0.18 -0.23 -0.18 -0.45  0.08 -0.16 -0.51  0.20 -0.05  0.02 
  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.05*  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.22  0.59 
USR  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.22  0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 
  0.55  0.93  0.58  0.91  0.00***  0.49  0.11  0.04**  0.40  0.04**  0.50 
UUR -0.19 -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 -0.42  0.06 -0.14 -0.48  0.18 -0.04 -0.02 
  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.13  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.29  0.70 
SROA -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.28  0.11  0.03 -0.58  0.28 -0.08   
  0.19  0.09*  0.13  0.07*  0.00***  0.01**  0.53  0.00***  0.00***  0.05*  
SROE -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05  0.03 -0.05 -0.18 -0.05 -0.01   
  0.58  0.72  0.59  0.73  0.22  0.44  0.28  0.00***  0.22  0.89  
SEPS -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06  0.10 -0.03 -0.47  0.14  0.00   
  0.58  0.72  0.59  0.74  0.14  0.02**  0.52  0.00***  0.00***  0.97  
DOI   0.94  0.99  0.92  0.47  0.23  0.12  0.25 -0.04  0.02  0.07 
   0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.40  0.62  0.10 
DOI2     0.94  0.99  0.36  0.16  0.09  0.21 -0.05  0.01  0.05 
    0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.04**  0.00***  0.19  0.73  0.22 
LagDOI       0.94  0.46  0.23  0.13  0.25 -0.05  0.02  0.07 
     0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.27  0.62  0.08* 
LagDOI2         0.34  0.14  0.09  0.20 -0.07  0.01  0.05 
      0.00***  0.00***  0.03**  0.00***  0.11  0.73  0.23 
SIZE           0.15 -0.12  0.39 -0.17  0.05  0.05 
       0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.24  0.24 
LEV            -0.17  0.02  0.38 -0.03  0.13 
        0.00***  0.71  0.00***  0.41  0.00*** 
LIQ               0.19 -0.19  0.02  0.01 
         0.00***  0.00***  0.70  0.77 
PRO                -0.14  0.12  0.04 
          0.00***  0.01**  0.34 
EF                  -0.20  0.13 
           0.00***  0.00*** 
GW                     0.00 
            0.98 
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Table 4 presents the Pearson’s correlation analysis for the bivariate correlations among 
all variables in this study for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations. SR negatively 
correlates with DOI (r = -0.20) and LIQ (r = - 0.36) while positively correlating with SIZE (r = 
0.27) and GW (r = 0.27).  UR correlates with none of the variables. SROA does not significantly 
correlate with the variables. DOI indicates a positive and significant correlation with SIZE (r = 
0.40), LEV (r = 0.19), and PRO (r = 0.30).  
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Table 4  
Pearson’s correlation for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations 
Note. Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; SROA = standard deviation of 
return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of return on equity (net income/total equity); 
SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of internationalization, measured by the number of 
foreign units/total units; DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; LagDOI = degree of internationalization, measured by the 
number of foreign units/total units at t-1; LagDOI2 = the squared form of LagDOI; SIZE = a firm size, measured by 
log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes 
(EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
 
  
V DOI DOI2 LagDOI LagDOI2 SIZE LEV LIQ PRO EF GW DIV 
SR -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19  0.27 0.09 -0.36  0.04  0.01  0.27 -0.01 
  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 0.15  0.00***  0.58  0.86  0.00***  0.90 
UR -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07  0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.10  0.00 -0.01  0.01 
  0.16  0.26  0.17  0.26  0.99 0.84  0.30  0.11  1.00  0.82  0.90 
DSR -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11  0.17 0.15 -0.14  0.08  0.01  0.25  0.00 
  0.06*  0.08*  0.06*  0.08*  0.01** 0.02**  0.03**  0.19  0.92  0.00***  1.00 
DUR -0.25 -0.22 -0.27 -0.23 -0.32 0.13 -0.12 -0.49  0.07 -0.13  0.08 
  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 0.04**  0.05*  0.00***  0.30  0.04**  0.21 
USR -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13  0.21 0.01 -0.29 -0.03 -0.04  0.22 -0.08 
  0.02**  0.03**  0.02**  0.04**  0.00*** 0.93  0.00***  0.60  0.54  0.00***  0.23 
UUR -0.22 -0.19 -0.23 -0.20 -0.30 0.07 -0.10 -0.44  0.02  0.04  0.00 
  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 0.30  0.13  0.00***  0.77  0.57  0.96 
SROA -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  0.07 -0.01  
  0.26  0.46  0.26  0.47  0.06* 0.79  0.74  0.88  0.30  0.84  
SROE  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.01 0.05 -0.15 -0.02  0.02  0.01  
  0.32  0.36  0.33  0.35  0.88 0.41  0.02**  0.75  0.81  0.90  
SEPS -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04  0.00 -0.02  0.05  0.02 -0.12 -0.01  
  0.20  0.49  0.21  0.52  0.95 0.81  0.42  0.75  0.06*  0.91  
DOI   0.95  0.98  0.93  0.40 0.19  0.08  0.30  0.06  0.02  0.08 
   0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 0.00***  0.20  0.00***  0.33  0.73  0.19 
DOI2    0.94  0.99  0.33 0.12  0.05  0.26  0.00  0.03  0.06 
    0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 0.07*  0.39  0.00***  0.94  0.65  0.37 
LagDOI     0.95  0.40 0.18  0.10  0.30  0.01  0.05  0.09 
     0.00***  0.00*** 0.00***  0.12  0.00***  0.52  0.45  0.16 
LagDOI2      0.32 0.10  0.06  0.25 -0.02  0.04  0.06 
      0.00*** 0.12  0.35  0.00***  0.71  0.48  0.39 
SIZE      0.10 -0.30  0.36 -0.04  0.22  0.06 
      0.14  0.00***  0.00***  0.57  0.00***  0.35 
LEV       -0.13  0.18  0.49  0.01  0.15 
        0.04**  0.01**  0.00***  0.88  0.02 
LIQ         0.20 -0.16  0.01  0.01 
        0.00***  0.01**  0.93  0.83 
PRO          0.18  0.18  0.05 
          0.01**  0.00***  0.43 
EF           0.02  0.18 
           0.77  0.01** 
GW           -0.02 
            0.77 
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Linear Effects 
Based on the literature review, this study examined three different effects of 
internationalization:  linear-effects, non-linear effects, and lagged effects on nine various risk 
measures under two categories: (1) Market-based risk measures (i.e., systematic risk, 
unsystematic risk, downside systematic risk, downside unsystematic risk, upside systematic risk, 
and upside unsystematic risk), and (2) accounting-based risk measures (i.e.., standard deviation 
of ROA, ROE, and EPS). For data analysis, the study performed panel regression analyses, either 
two-way fixed-effects model or two-way random-effects model based upon the results of the 
Hausman test.  
As noted, this study suggests five hypotheses pertaining to the effects of 
internationalization on U.S. restaurant firms’ risk. H1 hypothesizes that the degree of a U.S. 
restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s systematic risk. H2 
hypothesizes that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects 
the firm’s unsystematic risk. H3 hypothesizes that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s 
internationalization significantly affects the firm’s ROA risk. H4 hypothesizes that the degree of 
a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s ROE risk. Finally, H5 
hypothesizes that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects 
the firm’s EPS risk. 
Table 5 (see Appendix A) presents the results of the linear effects between DOI and six 
market-based risk measures for all the U.S. restaurant firms. According to the random-effects 
model estimation based by the Hausman test, the effect of internationalization appears to have a 
modestly significant and negative linear effect on systematic risk (z-value = -1.71; p-value = 
0.09), supporting H1 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly 
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affects the firm’s systematic risk.. Among other risk measures, only upside systematic risk (z-
value = -2.49; p-value = 0.01) are found to be negatively related to internationalization at the 
significance level of 0.05.  
Table 6 presents the results of the linear effects between DOI and three accounting-based 
risk measures in the first category (i.e., all the U.S. restaurant firms). None of these risk measures 
have relationships with DOI, rejecting the hypotheses that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s 
internationalization significantly affects the firm’s accounting-based risk. 
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Table 6 
Linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
DOI 0.08 1.31 0.19 
SIZE -0.08 -6.85*** 0.00 
LEV -0.02 -1.34 0.18 
LIQ 0.00 0.91 0.36 
PRO 0.04 2.34** 0.02 
EF 0.04 5.27*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -1.86* 0.06 
Standard deviation of ROE 
DOI 0.33 0.17 0.87 
SIZE -0.37 -0.80 0.42 
LEV 0.27 1.22 0.22 
LIQ 0.07 0.59 0.56 
PRO 1.17 4.86*** 0.00 
EF 0.35 1.70* 0.09 
GW -0.01 -1.38 0.17 
Standard deviation of EPS 
DOI -1.02 -1.03 0.30 
SIZE 0.51 2.41** 0.02 
LEV 0.52 2.78** 0.01 
LIQ 0.18 1.94* 0.05 
PRO 0.17 0.44 0.66 
EF 0.00 0.02 0.98 
GW 0.00 0.07 0.94 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of 
total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and 
taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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U.S. restaurant firms with international operations presents similar results. Table 7 (see 
Appendix B) presents the results of the linear effects of DOI on market-based risk measures for 
U.S. restaurant firms with international operations. Among those risk measures, 
internationalization has a highly significant and negative relationship with systematic risk (z-
value = -2.91; p-value = 0.00) at the significance level of 0.01, supporting H1 that the degree of a 
U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s systematic risk. . 
Among other risk measures, only upside systematic risk (z-value = -2.93; p-value = 0.00) are 
found to be negatively related to internationalization. Table 8 presents the results of the linear 
effects between DOI and accounting-based risk measures for U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations. None of these risk measures have relationships with DOI, indicating 
that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization does not affect the firm’s 
accounting-based risk. 
 
 
 
  
  58 
Table 8 
Linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms with  
 
international operations  
 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
DOI 0.00 -0.02 0.98 
SIZE -0.07 -5.61*** 0.00 
LEV 0.02 1.33 0.18 
LIQ -0.01 -2.05** 0.04 
PRO 0.25 9.55*** 0.00 
EF 0.02 1.92* 0.06 
GW 0.00 0.72 0.47 
Standard deviation of ROE 
DOI 0.44 1.00 0.32 
SIZE -0.44 -2.57** 0.01 
LEV -0.02 -0.12 0.91 
LIQ -0.09 -0.97 0.33 
PRO 1.13 1.83* 0.07 
EF 0.01 0.07 0.95 
GW 0.02 1.01 0.31 
Standard deviation of EPS 
DOI 0.57 0.69 0.49 
SIZE 0.93 2.89*** 0.00 
LEV -0.06 -0.24 0.81 
LIQ -0.07 -0.87 0.39 
PRO -0.84 -1.51 0.13 
EF -0.09 -0.59 0.56 
GW 0.01 0.33 0.74 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of 
total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and 
taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Non-Linear Effects 
Table 9 (see Appendix C) presents the results of the non-linear effects of DOI on market-
based risk measures for all the U.S. restaurant firms, indicating that non-linear relationships 
between DOI and market-based risk measures are not significant. Table 10 presents the results of 
the non-linear effects of DOI on accounting-based risk measures for all the U.S. restaurant firms, 
indicating that non-linear relationships between DOI and accounting-based risk measures are not 
significant, rejecting the hypotheses that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s 
internationalization significantly affects the firm’s accounting-based risk measures. 
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Table 10  
Non-linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant 
firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
DOI 0.24 1.86* 0.06 
DOI2 -0.20 -1.40 0.16 
SIZE -0.08 -6.95*** 0.00 
LEV -0.02 -1.36 0.17 
LIQ 0.00 0.90 0.37 
PRO 0.04 2.38** 0.02 
EF 0.04 5.26*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -1.85* 0.06 
Standard deviation of ROE 
DOI -1.00 -0.32 0.75 
DOI2 1.20 0.32 0.75 
SIZE -0.40 -1.65 0.10 
LEV 0.39 1.81* 0.07 
LIQ -0.02 -0.20 0.84 
PRO 0.93 3.99*** 0.00 
EF 0.22 1.17 0.24 
GW 0.00 -1.22 0.22 
Standard deviation of EPS 
DOI -2.02 -0.76 0.45 
DOI2 1.32 0.41 0.68 
SIZE 0.52 2.44** 0.02 
LEV 0.52 2.79** 0.01 
LIQ 0.18 1.95* 0.05 
PRO 0.16 0.43 0.67 
EF 0.01 0.03 0.97 
GW 0.00 0.07 0.94 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi                                       
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; SIZE = a 
firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; 
LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, 
measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset 
turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in 
before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Similarly, U.S. restaurant firms with international operations generally shows that 
relationships between DOI and risk measures are not significant. Table 11 (see Appendix D) 
presents that non-linear effects between DOI and market-based risk measures for U.S. restaurant 
firms with international operations are not significant, rejecting the hypotheses that the degree of 
a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s marketing-based risk 
measures. 
Table 12 presents the results of the non-linear effects of DOI on accounting-based risk 
measures for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations. Interestingly, standard deviation 
of ROA only has an inverted U-shaped relationship with DOI (z-value = -2.14; p-value = 0.04) at 
the significance level of 0.05, supporting H3 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s 
internationalization significantly affects the firm’s ROA risk. 
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Table 12 
Non-linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
DOI 0.20 2.02** 0.04 
DOI2 -0.24 -2.14** 0.03 
SIZE -0.08 -5.92*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 1.07 0.29 
LIQ -0.01 -2.16** 0.03 
PRO 0.26 9.73*** 0.00 
EF 0.02 1.61 0.11 
GW 0.00 0.72 0.47 
Standard deviation of ROE 
DOI 1.28 0.92 0.36 
DOI2 -1.02 -0.63 0.53 
SIZE -0.47 -2.65** 0.01 
LEV -0.04 -0.20 0.84 
LIQ -0.09 -1.00 0.32 
PRO 1.15 1.87* 0.06 
EF 0.00 -0.02 0.98 
GW 0.02 1.01 0.31 
Standard deviation of EPS 
DOI 0.75 0.46 0.64 
DOI2 -0.24 -0.13 0.90 
SIZE 0.93 2.89*** 0.00 
LEV -0.06 -0.23 0.81 
LIQ -0.07 -0.87 0.39 
PRO -0.83 -1.50 0.14 
EF -0.10 -0.60 0.55 
GW 0.01 0.33 0.74 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi                                       
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; SIZE = a 
firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; 
LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, 
measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset 
turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in 
before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Lagged Effects 
 Table 13 (see Appendix E) presents the results of the lagged-linear effects between DOI 
and nine market-based risk measures for all the U.S. restaurant firms. Among risk measures, 
systematic risk (z-value = -2.10; p-value = 0.04) is found to be negatively related to 
internationalization at the significance level of 0.05, supporting H1 that the degree of a U.S. 
restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s systematic risk. Specifically, 
internationalization appears to decrease restaurant firms’ systematic risk in a lagged-linear 
manner.  
Table 14 presents the results of the lagged-linear effects between DOI and three 
accounting-based risk measures for all the U.S. restaurant firms. None of these risk measures 
have relationships with the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization, rejecting the 
hypotheses that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the 
firm’s accounting-based risk measures. 
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Table 14 
Lagged-linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant 
firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
LagDOI 0.10 1.40 0.16 
SIZE -0.06 -4.50*** 0.00 
LEV -0.01 -1.03 0.30 
LIQ 0.01 1.31 0.19 
PRO 0.11 11.79*** 0.00 
EF 0.03 3.97*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -1.92* 0.06 
Standard deviation of ROE 
LagDOI -1.22 -0.76 0.45 
SIZE -0.47 -1.14 0.26 
LEV 0.57 3.44*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.08 0.77 0.44 
PRO 0.83 4.67*** 0.00 
EF 0.09 0.54 0.59 
GW -0.01 -1.64 0.10 
Standard deviation of EPS 
LagDOI -1.83 -1.05 0.29 
SIZE 0.87 2.02** 0.04 
LEV 0.42 2.35** 0.02 
LIQ 0.32 2.95*** 0.00 
PRO 0.40 2.13** 0.03 
EF -0.01 -0.03 0.98 
GW 0.00 -0.43 0.67 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1LagDOIt -1+ α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  +εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  +εi    
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log 
of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and 
taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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U.S. restaurant firms with international operations present somewhat different results. 
Table 15 (see Appendix F) presents the results of the lagged-linear effects between DOI and risk 
measures for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations. Internationalization has highly 
significant and negative relationships with downside systematic risk (z-value = -3.62; p-value = 
0.00) and upside systematic risk (z-value = -2.70; p-value = 0.01), supporting that the degree of a 
U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s systematic risk in a 
lagged-linear manner. 
Table 16 presents the results of the lagged-linear effects between DOI and three 
accounting-based risk measures for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations. ROA risk 
appears to be positively related to DOI (z-value = 2.06; p-value = 0.04) at the significance level 
of 0.05, supporting H3 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization 
significantly affects the firm’s ROA risk in a lagged-linear manner.  
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Table 16 
Lagged-linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms 
with international operations 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
LagDOI 0.13 2.06** 0.04 
SIZE -0.12 -4.82*** 0.00 
LEV 0.02 1.01 0.31 
LIQ -0.02 -3.49*** 0.00 
PRO 0.25 9.42*** 0.00 
EF 0.02 1.53 0.13 
GW 0.00 0.53 0.59 
Standard deviation of ROE 
LagDOI 1.56 1.57 0.12 
SIZE -1.73 -4.43*** 0.00 
LEV -0.43 -1.67* 0.09 
LIQ -0.18 -1.83* 0.07 
PRO 0.27 0.39 0.70 
EF -0.15 -0.78 0.43 
GW -0.02 -1.10 0.27 
Standard deviation of EPS 
LagDOI 0.89 1.06 0.29 
SIZE 1.17 3.72*** 0.00 
LEV -0.27 -1.23 0.22 
LIQ -0.07 -0.93 0.35 
PRO -1.27 -2.28** 0.02 
EF -0.08 -0.49 0.62 
GW 0.01 0.85 0.39 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1LagDOIt -1+ α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  +εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt  +εi    
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log 
of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). 
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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With respect to lagged non-linear effects for all the U.S. restaurant firms, Table 17 (see 
Appendix G) presents the results of the lagged non-linear effects of DOI on market-based risk 
measures, indicating lagged non-linear relationships between DOI and market-based risk 
measures are not significant. Thus, the results reject the hypotheses that the degree of a U.S. 
restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s market-based risk measures 
in a lagged non-linear manner. 
Table 18 presents the results of the non-linear effects of DOI on accounting-based risk 
measures for all the U.S. restaurant firms, indicating lagged non-linear relationships between 
DOI and accounting-based risk measures. Hence, the results reject the hypotheses that the degree 
of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s accounting-based 
risk measures in a lagged non-linear manner. 
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Table 18 
Lagged non-linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for All the U.S. 
restaurant firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
LagDOI 0.26 1.86* 0.06 
LagDOI2 -0.20 -1.33 0.18 
SIZE -0.06 -4.61*** 0.00 
LEV -0.01 -1.08 0.28 
LIQ 0.01 1.17 0.24 
PRO 0.11 11.77*** 0.00 
EF 0.03 3.93*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -1.94* 0.05 
Standard deviation of ROE 
LagDOI -4.13 -1.33 0.18 
LagDOI2 3.80 1.10 0.27 
SIZE -0.44 -1.08 0.28 
LEV 0.61 3.59*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.09 1.87 0.39 
PRO 0.86 4.79*** 0.00 
EF 0.10 0.63 0.53 
GW -0.01 -1.62 0.11 
Standard deviation of EPS 
LagDOI -1.77 -0.54 0.59 
LagDOI2 -0.08 -0.02 0.98 
SIZE 0.87 2.01** 0.04 
LEV 0.42 2.32** 0.02 
LIQ 0.32 2.93*** 0.00 
PRO 0.40 2.11** 0.04 
EF -0.01 -0.03 0.97 
GW 0.00 -0.43 0.67 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi                                       
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; LagDOI2 = the squared form of 
LagDOI; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total 
debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a 
firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, 
measured by asset turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual 
percentage change in before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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In respects to U.S. restaurant firms with international operations, Table 19 (see Appendix 
H) presents that lagged non-linear effects of DOI on market-based risk measures are not 
significant except for downside unsystematic risk. Downside unsystematic risk appears to have a 
significantly inverted U-shaped relationship with DOI (z-value = -2.13; p-value = 0.03) at the 
significance level of 0.05.  
Table 20 presents the results of the lagged non-linear effects of DOI on accounting-based 
risk measures for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations, indicating that non-linear 
relationships between DOI and accounting-based risk measures are not significant. However, 
like as a non-linear relationship, standard deviation of ROA only has a significantly inverted U-
shaped relationship with DOI (z-value = -2.42; p-value = 0.02) at the significance level of 0.05, 
supporting H3 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects 
the firm’s ROA risk in a lagged non-linear manner.  
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Table 20 
Lagged non-linear effects of internationalization on accounting-based risk for U.S. restaurant 
firms with international operations  
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Standard deviation of ROA 
LagDOI 0.37 3.14*** 0.00 
LagDOI2 -0.30 -2.42** 0.02 
SIZE -0.12 -5.09*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 0.91 0.37 
LIQ -0.02 -3.86*** 0.00 
PRO 0.26 9.61*** 0.00 
EF 0.02 1.37 0.17 
GW 0.00 0.41 0.68 
Standard deviation of ROE 
LagDOI 2.15 1.11 0.27 
LagDOI2 -0.70 -0.35 0.73 
SIZE -1.75 -4.45*** 0.00 
LEV -0.43 -1.69* 0.09 
LIQ -0.18 -1.86* 0.06 
PRO 0.28 0.40 0.69 
EF -0.16 -0.80 0.42 
GW -0.02 -1.12 0.26 
Standard deviation of EPS 
LagDOI 2.25 1.45 0.15 
LagDOI2 -1.76 -1.04 0.30 
SIZE 1.15 3.64*** 0.00 
LEV -0.27 -1.24 0.22 
LIQ -0.09 -1.07 0.28 
PRO -1.23 -2.22** 0.03 
EF -0.10 -0.62 0.54 
GW 0.01 0.82 0.41 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SROAt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi    
SROEt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi    
SEPSt = α0 + α1LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt  + εi                                       
Where, SROA = standard deviation of return on assets (net income/total assets); SROE = standard deviation of 
return on equity (net income/total equity); SEPS = standard deviation of earnings per share; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; LagDOI2 = the squared form of 
LagDOI; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total 
debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a 
firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, 
measured by asset turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); and GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual 
percentage change in before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Table 21 summarizes the comprehensive analyses of a relationship between one primary 
independent variable (i.e. the degree of internationalization) and nine risk measures (i.e., 
systematic risk, unsystematic risk, downside systematic risk, downside unsystematic risk, upside 
systematic risk, upside unsystematic risk, standard deviation of ROA, standard deviation of 
ROE, and standard deviation of EPS) in linear, non-linear, lagged manners, respectively. In 
summary, the findings of this study revealed that internationalization tend to mitigate systematic 
risk.  Furthermore, internationalization tend to have an inverted U-shaped relationship with ROA 
risk, indicating that risk-increasing effects of internationalization on a restaurant firm’s ROA risk 
exist at the initial stage of internationalization and risk-reducing effects of internationalization on 
the restaurant firm’s ROA risk occur at the later stage of internationalization. 
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Table 21 
Summary of the results on the relationship between internationalization and risk  
Dependent Variables Linear Nonlinear Lag-linear Lag-
nonlinear 
All the U.S. restaurant firms 
Systematic Risk Ne (0.09*) - Ne (0.04**) - 
Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Downside Systematic Risk - - - - 
Downside Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Upside Systematic Risk Ne (0.01**) - - - 
Upside Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Standard deviation of ROA - - - - 
Standard deviation of ROE - - - - 
Standard deviation of EPS - - - - 
U.S. restaurant firms with international operations 
Systematic Risk Ne(0.00***) - - - 
Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Downside Systematic Risk - - Ne(0.00***) - 
Downside Unsystematic Risk - - - InU(0.03**) 
Upside Systematic Risk Ne(0.00***) - Ne(0.01***) - 
Upside Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Standard deviation of ROA - InU(0.03**) Po(0.04**) InU(0.02**) 
Standard deviation of ROE - - - - 
Standard deviation of EPS - - - - 
Note. ROA = return on assets (net income/total assets); ROE = return on equity (net income/total equity); EPS = 
earnings per share; Ne = Negative relationship; Po = Positive relationship; InU = Inverted U-shaped relationship; 
and  - = no significant relationship.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
 
Conclusion 
The models discussed in the previous chapter are analyzed using either two-way fixed-
effects models or two-way random-effects models based upon the results of the Hausman test in 
STATA. In summary, the findings of this study present mixed results depending on various risk 
measures and the characteristics of the data (either all the U.S. restaurant firms or U.S. restaurant 
firms with international operations). Specifically, with respect to linear effects, systematic risk 
tends to have a significant and negative relationship, supporting H1 which argues that the degree 
of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization significantly affects the firm’s systematic risk. 
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Furthermore, ROA risk appears to have a significant and inverted U-shaped relationship with 
restaurant firms, supporting H3 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization 
significantly affects the firm’s ROA risk. The findings of this study appear to reject H2, H4, and 
H5.  That is, the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization does not significantly 
affect the firm’s unsystematic risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk. The next chapter will discuss the 
findings of this study in depth, present theoretical and practical implications, and suggest 
recommendations for future research, as well as limitations of this current study.  
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of this dissertation and discusses implications drawn 
from the results. Overall, the dissertation finds significant relationships between the degree of a 
U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization and the firm’s systematic risk and ROA risk; yet it 
finds that relationships between the degree of internationalization and the firm’s unsystematic 
risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk are not significant.   
Findings  
First, the findings of this study reveal a significant and negative relationship between the 
degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization and the firm’s systematic risk, thereby 
supporting prior studies that argue for negative relationships (e.g., Agmon & Lessard, 1977; 
Hughes, Logue, & Sweeney, 1975; Michel & Shaked, 1986; Shapiro, 1978). The same results are 
found with upside systematic risk. In other words, the empirical results in this study support risk-
reduction effects that, for publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms, benefits such as economies of 
scale and synergy gains from diversifying into international markets may outweigh the 
disadvantages engendered by the agency problem from internationalization. Therefore, the 
findings seem to support modern portfolio theory. In particular, given the fact that the restaurant 
business is highly competitive and saturated, the advantage of diversifying its business into 
international markets may be even greater for the restaurant industry than for other business 
sectors, supporting prior literature (Dunning, 1989; Kirca, Hult, Deligonul, Perryy, & Cavusgil, 
2012). Additionally considering lagged effects, the findings of this study show significant and 
negative lagged-linear effects of internationalization on restaurant firms’ systematic risk. A lag 
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effect presents the effect of a previous value of the lagged variable (i.e., internationalization) 
when there is some inherent ordering of the observations of this variable. In other words, 
internationalization in the previous period (i.e., last year) significantly decreases restaurant firms’ 
systematic risk in the current period (i.e., this year).  
Second, the findings of this study show a significant and inverted U-shaped relationship 
between internationalization and ROA risk. In other words, the risk-increasing effects of 
internationalization on a restaurant firm’s ROA risk exist at the initial stage of 
internationalization, whereas the risk-reducing effects of internationalization on the restaurant 
firm’s ROA risk occur at the later stage of internationalization. This phenomenon may be 
explained by initial costs and the benefits realized in the long term. It is suggested that initial 
internationalization requires firms to invest in learning about foreign markets. Owing to the 
barriers, the operations costs, and complications of managing widely scattered properties, 
internationalization initially tends to aggravate restaurant firms’ ROA risk. However, in the long 
run, internationalization tends to alleviate firms’ ROA risk resulting from the benefits of sharing 
the company’s core competencies in diversified markets. Consistent with non-linear effects, 
internationalization appears to have significant and inverted U-shaped lagged effects on firms’ 
ROA risk at the significance level of 0.05. 
Third, the results of this study generally present that effects of internationalization on 
restaurant firms’ unsystematic risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk are not significant, confirming 
previous literature that argues for not-significant relationships (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Fatemi, 1984; 
Jacquillat & Solnik, 1978; Sledge, 2000). It can be presumed that the benefits accrued from 
diversification and the costs caused by increasing complexity of international operations can be 
offset, which may lead to non-significant effects on unsystematic risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk. 
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Moreover, numerous confounding factors might exist when implementing and investigating 
restaurant firms’ internationalization strategies pertaining to firms’ unsystematic risk, ROE risk, 
and EPS risk. Therefore, discovering a conclusive relationship might be elusive.  
Implications of Findings 
Restaurant firms’ strategic decisions regarding operating, investing, and financing can 
influence the characteristics of risk (Breen & Lerner, 1973; Gu & Kim, 2002). 
Internationalization is one of the most momentous strategic decisions that restaurant executives 
need to make and can affect certain aspects of firms’ risk (Hughes et al., 1975; Liang & Rhoades, 
1988; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).  
Numerous restaurant firms have implemented internationalization as a corporate strategy 
and risk management is one of the crucial concerns of firms operating in international markets 
(Ghoshal, 1987). Nevertheless, the holistic mechanism of internationalization associated with 
risk has not often been examined explicitly. Furthermore, due to its ambivalence, the relationship 
between internationalization and risk has been an empirical question. Additionally, the degree of 
risk can vary among industries due to levels of risk peculiar to differing contexts (Borde, 1998). 
Specifically, the inherently high risk of the restaurant industry, caused by high sensitivity to 
economic conditions, may render restaurants more vulnerable to risk. Consequently, an 
examination of internationalization in a risk context seems noteworthy for the industry, both 
theoretically and practically.  
Theoretical Implications 
Based upon the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997), which goes beyond the 
framework of CAPM, this dissertation investigates restaurant firms’ internationalization 
associated with various risk. While most previous research focuses on the effects of 
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internationalization on market-based risk including systematic and unsystematic risk, this 
dissertation expands the analysis to accounting-based risk including ROA risk, ROE risk, and 
EPS risk. Therefore, this dissertation better provides a full spectrum of risk variables that reflect 
the realities of internationalization strategies in the contemporary business environment. The 
empirical results suggest that internationalization partially mitigates a restaurant firm’s 
systematic risk, supporting modern portfolio theory that argues that multinational restaurant 
firms may alleviate their risk by taking advantage of diversifying their operations in foreign 
countries and supporting previous literature that argues for negative relationships (e.g., Agmon 
& Lessard, 1977; Hughes, Logue, & Sweeney, 1975; Michel & Shaked, 1986; Shapiro, 1978). 
Furthermore, the findings of this study present a significant and inverted U-shaped relationship 
between internationalization and ROA risk, indicating that internationalization initially tends to 
generate risk-increasing effects on a restaurant firm’s ROA risk caused by the initial costs, yet it 
also generates risk-reducing effects on a restaurant firm’s ROA risk due to the benefits at the 
later stage of internationalization. The findings of non-significant effects of internationalization 
on unsystematic risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk support previous literature that argues for no 
relationships (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Sledge, 2000) between internationalization and risk. The 
results of this study not only enrich the internationalization and risk management literature, but 
also the hospitality literature by primarily focusing on U.S. restaurant firms.   
Practical Implications 
Primarily focusing on the restaurant industry, this dissertation provides more detailed and 
customized information to restaurant executives and investors, as well as to restaurant literature. 
Different industries may exhibit specific optimum combination levels of domestic and foreign 
business because of several factors, such as idiosyncratic entry barrier conditions (Daniels & 
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Bracket, 1989). Determining the optimum level is critical due to firms’ limited resources; 
however, restaurant executives have limited theoretical and empirical information. In this 
respect, this industry-specific examination can guide them when narrowing the estimation range 
of the optimum ratio and deciding the extent to which international operations are appropriate. In 
addition, the findings of this study can be applicable to other industries that are sensitive to 
discretionary consumption expenditures, such as the hotel and tourism industries.   
This dissertation highlights the importance of risk management for restaurant firms. 
Restaurant executives who are in charge of their international operations could consider these 
findings when developing strategic plans for international operations. Certainly, risks accompany 
expansion into international markets; however, restaurant executives can be more informed on 
risk management and gain more confidence in pursuing internationalization strategies, 
acknowledging that more international operations can somewhat mitigate  restaurant firms’ 
systematic and ROA risk in the long run. Lower beta implies lower cost of equity, which directly 
influences a firm’s ability to manage capital investment. Additionally, within accounting-based 
risk measures, only ROA risk appears to be impacted by internationalization, supporting the 
argument that MNCs can have earnings that are less correlated with those of the domestic 
market. Consequently, regarding the implications of internationalization, it could be more critical 
and valuable for restaurant executives to focus on and scrutinize restaurant firms’ variations of 
ROA rather than other accounting-based risk measures, including ROE and EPS. 
Furthermore, investors and financial analysts could utilize the findings of this study to 
estimate their investment options based upon the aspects of risk applicable to different risk 
measures and restaurant firms’ internationalization strategies. Investors’ ability to diversify their 
portfolios internationally is limited (Krapl, 2015). The results of this study propose that risk-
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averse investors could specifically consider purchasing shares of multinational restaurant firms 
with internationally diversified portfolios to realize the risk-reduction benefits from 
internationalization in an indirect manner. Moreover, if investors acknowledge the benefits of a 
corporation’s internationalization, they are likely to require lower returns from restaurant firms 
or lower measures of risk to the firm’s equity. Therefore, internationalization can moderate the 
riskiness of the firm by increasing its debt capacity (e.g., Hughes et al., 1975; Logue & Merville, 
1972). Accordingly, the stock price would increase and the wealth of the restaurant firms’ 
shareholders would be maximized.  
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research  
This study is not without limitations, and the results contained herein raise questions 
about several perspectives for future research. First, that the study is limited to publicly traded 
U.S. restaurant firms may affect the generalizability of the results. Future studies could extend to 
restaurant firms in foreign countries for market-based risk and accounting-based risk or to U.S. 
private restaurants for accounting-based risk only, based upon the data availability, to provide 
more convincing information and to enhance the external validity of the findings of this 
dissertation.  
Second, the restaurant industry faces a changing business environment which may alter 
the risk features. Despite wide popularity in the past due to its convenience, the fast food 
segment, the largest segment in the industry, has begun to encounter market challenges caused 
by consumers’ increasing demand for quality because of health concerns, fierce competition with 
other restaurant segments, and high employee turnover (Little, 2014; Schoen, 2013). The rapid 
growth of the casual-dining restaurant segment has added to the recent struggles of the fast-food 
segment (Tice, 2013). Thus, subsequent research extending the study to investigate specific types 
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of restaurant firms can thoroughly reveal a detailed view of internationalization from the 
perspective of risk and assist restaurant executives in improving risk management as linked to 
internationalization strategies.  
Third, the risk level for the restaurant industry can vary over time. Future studies may 
extend the time horizon to examine whether risk level varies over time. For instance, the 
relationship between internationalization and risk can vary depending on the stage of 
internationalization. In other words, firms in the advanced stages of internationalization may 
experience different levels of risk compared to the firms in the initial stages of 
internationalization. Fourth, this study examines the risk perspective of internationalization 
strategies solely in the restaurant industry; therefore, a resurgence of this research may be 
necessary in other hospitality segments, including the hotel and casino industries, which have 
also experienced significant international growth. This would facilitate cross-category 
comparisons of different hospitality sectors. Fifth, future studies could not only consider the 
effect of the recession on this topic, but also divide the samples by firm size to examine possible 
differences. 
Finally, as shown in Table 22 and Table 23, a majority of the models violates the 
homoscedasticity assumption (only 14 out of 72 models satisfied the assumption). The violation 
of the assumption about independent errors basically occurs due to two main reasons: 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Such violation results in biased standard errors even 
though panel data specific estimation methods (e.g., fixed effects model or random effects 
model) are employed (Baker, Stein, & Wurgluer, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003) as done in this 
dissertation.  
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Specifically, the standard errors produced by the panel estimation are unbiased only when 
the firm effects (serial correlation) is constant across time. However, the non-constant correlation 
yields biased standard errors which are usually smaller than true standard errors (Peterson, 
2009). Correcting these underestimated standard errors is therefore needed in order to conduct an 
accurate statistical inference, mainly dealing with problems caused by heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. To achieve such corrections, several methods have been suggested and evaluated 
in the econometrics literature. White (1984) introduced cluster-robust standard errors, which is a 
modified version of the White (1980) standard errors designed to deal with heteroscedasticity in 
a cross-sectional data. Newey-West (1987) standard errors generalized White (1984) standard 
errors in order to get robust standard errors to both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In the 
finance literature, Fama-MacBeth standard errors have been widely used to consider correlations 
across firms within a year, but this method is not applicable when autocorrelation exists 
(Peterson, 2009). In the panel data set, generally two types of correlation among errors need to 
be considered (1) correlation within a firm across time and (2) correlation within time across 
individuals. Considering the inherent problems, two-way clustering (clustering on both firm and 
time dimensions) has been suggested as a better method than many other estimation methods 
mentioned above to produce unbiased estimates for both cross-sectional (i.e., heteroscedasticity) 
and time-series correlations (autocorrelation) (Gow, Romazabal, & Taylor, 2010). 
Therefore, this dissertation re-ran the analyses using the two-way clustering and present 
results in Table 24. The two-way clustering analysis confirms that nine significant results are 
consistent with the findings in this dissertation (out of eleven statistically significant findings). 
Out of these two inconsistent findings, for the case that examined a nonlinear relationship 
between internationalization and standard deviation of ROA, the direction is still consistent, but 
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the p-value increases from 3.2% to 15.9% while for the case that examined a lag-nonlinear 
relationship between internationalization and Downside Unsystematic Risk, the sign of the 
coefficient changed from negative (i.e., inverted U-shape) to positive (i.e., U-shape). The both 
cases fail to show statistically significant results. However, again, the two-way clustering 
analysis confirmed on other nine cases with same signs and similar statistical significance levels. 
Nevertheless, the two-way clustering method is not a perfect solution for all issues 
involved in a panel data. The two-way clustering method cannot, for example, effectively deal 
with unobserved effects which typically happen in a panel data. As a result, this dissertation 
conducted the panel analysis (that is, either two-way fixed- or random-effects model) along with 
two-way clustering by firm and year to deal with this issue. In fact, the contemporary 
econometrics literature is still debating these panel analysis issues which clearly suggests that 
there is no perfect solution to deal with all the issues in the panel data setting. It is believed that 
the two-way fixed- or random-effects models provide relatively robust and reliable estimations, 
thus this dissertation maintains the results based on such models. By demonstrating that the 
original results that used either two-way fixed- or random-effects model (which, in fact, also 
takes care of biased standard errors issue at a certain degree caused by heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2003) are mostly consistent with the results from the two-way 
clustering method, this dissertation can reasonably argue that the original results are reliable even 
when homoscedasticity assumption is not satisfied. However, as mentioned, there are many 
unresolved issues in the panel analysis in the econometrics perspective even though there have 
been much development for the panel analysis in recent years (Hsiao, 2014). Future studies can 
investigate this topic based upon more thorough and proven analysis. 
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Table 22 
The homoscedasticity test for All the U.S. restaurant firms  
Relationships DVs P-value Chi-square 
 
Linear SR 0.01 7.85 
 DSR 0.00 20.10 
 USR 0.00 25.78 
 UR 0.00 902.20 
 DUR 0.00 286.38 
 UUR 0.00 428.32 
 ROA risk 0.00 531.08 
 ROE risk 0.00 19269.21 
 EPS risk 0.00 4598.83 
Non-linear SR 0.01 7.76 
 DSR 0.00 20.04 
 USR 0.00 25.70 
 UR 0.00 900.52 
 DUR 0.00 285.56 
 UUR 0.00 426.80 
 ROA risk 0.00 535.50 
 ROE risk 0.00 19251.14 
 EPS risk 0.00 4598.83 
Lagged-linear SR 0.00 13.79 
 DSR 0.00 8.77 
 USR 0.00 39.08 
 UR 0.00 1062.36 
 DUR 0.00 251.05 
 UUR 0.00 446.99 
 ROA risk 0.00 299.48 
 ROE risk 0.00 16196.30 
 EPS risk 0.00 3489.46 
Lagged non-linear SR 0.00 13.42 
 DSR 0.00 8.76 
 USR 0.00 39.23 
 UR 0.00 1064.42 
 DUR 0.00 254.48 
 UUR 0.00 447.38 
 ROA risk 0.00 303.38 
 ROE risk 0.00 16072.17 
 EPS risk 0.00 3489.61 
Note. Where, SR = systematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UR = 
unsystematic risk; DUR = downside unsystematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; ROA risk = return on 
assets (net income/total assets) risk; ROE risk = return on equity (net income/total equity) risk; and EPS risk = 
earnings per share risk.  
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Table 23 
The homoscedasticity test for U.S. restaurant firms with international operations 
Relationship DVs P-value Chi-square 
 
Linear SR 0.76 0.09 
 DSR 0.63 0.23 
 USR 0.72 0.13 
 UR 0.00 78.31 
 DUR 0.00 51.18 
 UUR 0.00 61.83 
 ROA risk 0.00 488.49 
 ROE risk 0.00 1019.78 
 EPS risk 0.00 506.14 
Non-linear SR 0.77 0.09 
 DSR 0.63 0.23 
 USR 0.72 0.13 
 UR 0.00 79.32 
 DUR 0.00 51.84 
 UUR 0.00 62.42 
 ROA risk 0.00 474.51 
 ROE risk 0.00 1020.16 
 EPS risk 0.00 505.05 
Lagged-linear SR 0.94 0.01 
 DSR 0.68 0.17 
 USR 0.37 0.80 
 UR 0.00 122.83 
 DUR 0.00 56.58 
 UUR 0.00 120.47 
 ROA risk 0.11 2.51 
 ROE risk 0.00 973.55 
 EPS risk 0.00 431.19 
Lagged non-linear SR 0.77 0.08 
 DSR 0.68 0.17 
 USR 0.51 0.43 
 UR 0.00 118.69 
 DUR 0.00 60.98 
 UUR 0.00 122.39 
 ROA risk 0.11 2.57 
 ROE risk 0.00 972.46 
 EPS risk 0.00 422.22 
Note. Where, SR = systematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UR = 
unsystematic risk; DUR = downside unsystematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; ROA risk = return on 
assets (net income/total assets) risk; ROE risk = return on equity (net income/total equity) risk; and EPS risk = 
earnings per share risk.  
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Table 24 
Summary of the results on the relationship between internationalization and risk using two-way 
clustering approach 
Dependent Variables Linear Nonlinear Lag-linear Lag-
nonlinear 
All the U.S. restaurant firms 
Systematic Risk Ne (0.08*) - Ne (0.07*) - 
Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Downside Systematic Risk - - - - 
Downside Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Upside Systematic Risk Ne (0.04**) - - - 
Upside Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Standard deviation of ROA - - - - 
Standard deviation of ROE - - - - 
Standard deviation of EPS - - - - 
U.S. restaurant firms with international operations 
Systematic Risk Ne(0.00***) - - - 
Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Downside Systematic Risk - - Ne(0.00***) - 
Downside Unsystematic Risk - - - U(0.10) 
Upside Systematic Risk Ne(0.00***) - Ne(0.00***) - 
Upside Unsystematic Risk - - - - 
Standard deviation of ROA - InU(0.16) Po(0.11) InU(0.02**) 
Standard deviation of ROE - - - - 
Standard deviation of EPS - - - - 
Note. Where, ROA = return on assets (net income/total assets); ROE = return on equity (net income/total equity); 
EPS = earnings per share; Ne = Negative relationship; Po = Positive relationship; InU = Inverted U-shaped 
relationship; and - = no significant relationship.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
 
Summary 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to advance the theoretical and practical understanding 
of the relationship between publicly traded U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization as a 
corporate strategy and risk using a comprehensive set of risk measures: 1) market-based risk 
(i.e., systematic and unsystematic risk) and 2) accounting-based risk (i.e., standard deviation of 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings per share (EPS)) during the period 
of 2000-2013.  
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In conclusion, overall, the results of this dissertation reveal significant relationships 
between internationalization and restaurant firms’ systematic risk as well as ROA risk, 
supporting H1 and H3 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s internationalization 
significantly affects the firm’s systematic risk and ROA risk. More specifically, the degree of 
internationalization, in general, tends to have a significant and negative relationship with 
restaurant firms’ systematic risk as well as a significant and inverted U-shaped relationship with 
firms’ ROA risk. On the other hand, overall, the findings of this study present that relationships 
between the degree of internationalization and unsystematic risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk are not 
significant, rejecting H2, H4, and H5 that the degree of a U.S. restaurant firm’s 
internationalization significantly affects the firm’s unsystematic risk, ROE risk, and EPS risk. 
This dissertation better provides a full spectrum of risk variables that reflect the realities 
of internationalization strategies in the contemporary business environment by investigating 
internationalization associated with market-based risk as well as accounting-based risk based 
upon the Carhart four-factor model. Furthermore, by highlighting the importance of risk 
management in the restaurant industry, the results provide more detailed information to 
restaurant executives and investors. Consequently, restaurant executives and investors can utilize 
the findings of this study when developing, implementing, and investigating restaurant firms’ 
internationalization strategies in a risk context.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 5 
Linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.32 -1.71* 0.09 
SIZE 0.26 5.25*** 0.00 
LEV -0.10 -1.48 0.14 
LIQ 0.02 0.74 0.46 
PRO 0.67 4.44*** 0.00 
EF -0.08 -1.73* 0.08 
GW 0.00 -0.60 0.55 
DIV 0.01 0.98 0.33 
Unsystematic Risk  
DOI 0.00 0.21 0.84 
SIZE -0.01 -3.44*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.21** 0.03 
LIQ 0.00 -3.48*** 0.00 
PRO -0.03 -5.16*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 1.83* 0.07 
GW 0.00 0.35 0.73 
DIV 0.00 0.64 0.52 
Downside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.32 -1.00 0.32 
SIZE 0.07 0.79 0.43 
LEV 0.10 1.29 0.20 
LIQ 0.05 2.28** 0.02 
PRO 0.37 2.76** 0.01 
EF -0.06 -1.27 0.20 
GW 0.00 0.13 0.90 
DIV 0.00 -0.00 1.00 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 -0.30  0.76 
SIZE -0.01 -2.96*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 3.08*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -1.98* 0.05 
PRO -0.01 -4.87*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -1.24 0.22 
GW 0.00 -0.07 0.95 
DIV 0.00 1.93* 0.05 
Upside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.31 -2.49** 0.01 
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Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
SIZE 0.19 5.64*** 0.00 
LEV -0.02 -0.43 0.67 
LIQ -0.04 -1.56 0.12 
PRO 0.40 2.63** 0.01 
EF -0.10 -2.89*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -4.07*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.47 0.64 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 0.30 0.77 
SIZE -0.02 -4.65*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.57** 0.01 
LIQ 0.00 -3.62*** 0.00 
PRO -0.02 -5.45*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 0.91 0.36 
GW 0.00 0.55 0.59 
DIV 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
URt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DSRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
USRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
UURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of 
total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes 
(EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 7 
Linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations  
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.38 -2.91*** 0.00 
SIZE 0.16 3.05*** 0.00 
LEV 0.08 1.45 0.15 
LIQ -0.08 -2.48** 0.01 
PRO 0.10 0.47 0.64 
EF -0.01 -0.21 0.83 
GW 0.12 6.62*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.54 0.59 
Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 0.04 0.97 
SIZE 0.01 3.66*** 0.00 
LEV 0.00 2.10** 0.04 
LIQ 0.00 -1.35 0.18 
PRO -0.02 -3.55*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -1.77* 0.08 
GW 0.00 1.86* 0.06 
DIV 0.00 0.79 0.43 
Downside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.30 -1.01 0.31 
SIZE 0.30 1.88* 0.06 
LEV 0.20 2.23** 0.03 
LIQ 0.00 0.05 0.96 
PRO 0.38 1.69* 0.09 
EF -0.09 -1.14 0.25 
GW 0.04 2.06** 0.04 
DIV 0.00 0.26 0.80 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 -0.65 0.52 
SIZE 0.01 2.19** 0.03 
LEV 0.01 3.35*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -0.17 0.86 
PRO -0.01 -3.49*** 0.00 
EF -0.01 -3.91*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -1.12 0.26 
DIV 0.00 1.86* 0.06 
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Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Upside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.27 -2.93*** 0.00 
SIZE 0.12 3.20*** 0.00 
LEV 0.02 0.57 0.57 
LIQ -0.06 -2.29** 0.02 
PRO -0.13 -0.60 0.55 
EF -0.02 -0.69 0.49 
GW 0.06 2.91*** 0.00 
DIV -0.01 -0.90 0.37 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 0.27 0.79 
SIZE 0.01 1.46 0.15 
LEV 0.00 1.98** 0.05 
LIQ 0.00 -2.13** 0.03 
PRO -0.02 -3.40*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -0.64 0.52 
GW 0.00 3.35*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.05 0.96 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
URt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DSRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
USRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
UURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of 
total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes 
(EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 9 
Non-linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant firms 
 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
DOI 0.10 0.19 0.85 
DOI2 -0.63 -0.84 0.40 
SIZE 0.25 4.99*** 0.00 
LEV -0.11 -1.59 0.11 
LIQ 0.02 0.68 0.50 
PRO 0.67 4.43*** 0.00 
EF -0.08 -1.74* 0.08 
GW 0.00 -0.61 0.54 
DIV 0.01 0.99 0.32 
Unsystematic Risk 
DOI -0.02 -0.56 0.58 
DOI2 0.03 0.73 0.47 
SIZE -0.01 -3.47*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.20** 0.03 
LIQ 0.00 -3.52*** 0.00 
PRO -0.03 -5.16*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 1.90* 0.06 
GW 0.00 0.36 0.72 
DIV 0.00 0.66 0.51 
Downside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.36 -0.51 0.61 
DOI2 0.07 0.07 0.95 
SIZE 0.07 0.78 0.44 
LEV 0.10 1.28 0.20 
LIQ 0.05 2.27** 0.02 
PRO 0.37 2.76* 0.06 
EF -0.06 -1.26 0.21 
GW 0.00 0.13 0.90 
DIV 0.00 -0.00 1.00 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI -0.01 -0.78 0.43 
DOI2 0.02 0.72 0.47 
SIZE -0.01 -3.00*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 3.07*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -2.02** 0.04 
PRO -0.01 -4.86*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -1.15 0.25 
GW 0.00 -0.05 0.96 
  92 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
DIV 0.00 1.95* 0.05 
Upside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.17 -0.47 0.64 
DOI2 -0.20 -0.39 0.70 
SIZE 0.19 5.31*** 0.00 
LEV -0.02 -0.50 0.62 
LIQ -0.04 -1.60 0.11 
PRO 0.40 2.63** 0.01 
EF -0.10 -2.90*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -4.07*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.46 0.64 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI -0.01 -0.41 0.68 
DOI2 0.02 0.62 0.54 
SIZE -0.02 -4.68*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.56** 0.01 
LIQ 0.00 -3.65*** 0.00 
PRO -0.02 -5.44*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 0.97 0.33 
GW 0.00 0.56 0.58 
DIV 0.00 0.02 0.99 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1DOIt+ α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
URt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
DSRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
DURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
USRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
UURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; SIZE = a 
firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; 
LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, 
measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset 
turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before 
interest and taxes (EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common 
share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Table 11 
Non-linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations  
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.25 -0.61 0.54 
DOI2 -0.18 -0.33 0.74 
SIZE 0.15 2.92*** 0.00 
LEV 0.07 1.36 0.17 
LIQ -0.08 -2.50** 0.01 
PRO 0.11 0.50 0.62 
EF -0.01 -0.23 0.82 
GW 0.12 6.62*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.54 0.59 
Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 -0.42 0.67 
DOI2 0.01 0.47 0.64 
SIZE -0.01 -4.15*** 0.00 
LEV 0.00 2.07** 0.04 
LIQ 0.00 -1.12 0.26 
PRO -0.06 -9.60*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 1.43 0.15 
GW 0.00 4.72*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.60 0.55 
Downside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.49 -2.00* 0.05 
DOI2 0.30 0.94 0.35 
SIZE 0.09 2.79** 0.01 
LEV 0.10 3.41*** 0.00 
LIQ -0.01 -0.47 0.64 
PRO 0.15 0.82 0.41 
EF -0.04 -1.46 0.14 
GW 0.06 3.70*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.08 0.94 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.00 0.26 0.79 
DOI2 -0.01 -0.61 0.54 
SIZE 0.01 2.24** 0.03 
LEV 0.01 3.38*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -0.10 0.92 
  94 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
PRO -0.01 -3.50*** 0.00 
EF -0.01 -3.96*** 0.00 
GW 0.00 -1.07 0.28 
DIV 0.00 1.84* 0.07 
Upside Systematic Risk 
DOI -0.40 -1.35 0.18 
DOI2 0.18 0.46 0.65 
SIZE 0.12 3.20*** 0.00 
LEV 0.02 0.65 0.52 
LIQ -0.05 -2.17** 0.03 
PRO -0.14 -0.64 0.52 
EF -0.02 -0.64 0.52 
GW 0.06 2.86*** 0.00 
DIV -0.01 -0.90 0.37 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
DOI 0.02 1.06 0.29 
DOI2 -0.03 -1.04 0.30 
SIZE 0.01 1.57 0.12 
LEV 0.00 2.03** 0.04 
LIQ 0.00 -1.98* 0.05 
PRO -0.02 -3.42*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -0.85 0.39 
GW 0.00 3.43*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1DOIt+ α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
URt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
DSRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
DURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
USRt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
UURt= α0 + α1DOIt + α2DOI2t + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt + α8GWt + α9DIVt +  εi    
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; DOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units; DOI2 = the squared form of DOI; SIZE = a 
firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; 
LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, 
measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset 
turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before 
interest and taxes (EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common 
share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Table 13 
Lagged-linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant 
firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.39 -2.10** 0.04 
SIZE 0.27 5.61*** 0.00 
LEV -0.08 -1.20 0.23 
LIQ 0.02 0.65 0.52 
PRO 0.64 4.34*** 0.00 
EF -0.07 -1.58 0.12 
GW 0.00 -0.33 0.74 
DIV 0.00 0.55 0.58 
Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.01 0.33 0.74 
SIZE -0.01 -3.49*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 1.99* 0.05 
LIQ 0.00 -3.27*** 0.00 
PRO -0.03 -4.63*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 2.39** 0.02 
GW 0.00 0.94 0.35 
DIV 0.00 0.33 0.74 
Downside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.19 -0.51 0.61 
SIZE 0.15 1.53 0.13 
LEV 0.09 1.18 0.24 
LIQ 0.08 3.16*** 0.00 
PRO 0.31 2.47** 0.01 
EF -0.06 -1.19 0.23 
GW 0.00 0.28 0.78 
DIV 0.00 -0.13 0.89 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.00 -0.24 0.81 
SIZE -0.01 -3.2*** 0.00 
LEV 0.00 2.88*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -1.84* 0.07 
PRO -0.01 -4.57*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -0.27 0.79 
GW 0.00 0.39 0.69 
DIV 0.00 0.91 0.37 
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Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Upside Systematic risk 
LagDOI 0.58 1.15 0.25 
SIZE -0.21 -1.66 0.10 
LEV -0.12 -1.25 0.21 
LIQ -0.09 -2.80** 0.01 
PRO 0.15 0.87 0.38 
EF -0.03 -0.52 0.60 
GW 0.00 -4.16*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.16 0.87 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.00 0.32 0.75 
SIZE -0.02 -5.38*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.54** 0.01 
LIQ 0.00 -3.06*** 0.00 
PRO -0.02 -5.13*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 1.80* 0.07 
GW 0.00 1.00 0.32 
DIV 0.00 0.01 0.99 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
URt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DSRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
USRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
UURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log 
of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes 
(EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Table 15 
Lagged-linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms with 
international operations  
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.25 -0.63 0.53 
SIZE 0.39 2.23** 0.03 
LEV 0.19 2.02** 0.04 
LIQ -0.01 -0.33 0.74 
PRO 0.43 1.83* 0.07 
EF 0.19 2.23** 0.03 
GW 0.06 2.84** 0.01 
DIV 0.00 0.27 0.79 
Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.00 -0.72 0.47 
SIZE -0.01 -4.37*** 0.00 
LEV 0.00 2.43** 0.02 
LIQ 0.00 -1.40 0.16 
PRO -0.05 -6.98*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 0.62 0.54 
GW 0.00 1.00 0.32 
DIV 0.00 -0.52 0.60 
Downside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.29 -3.62*** 0.00 
SIZE 0.08 2.58** 0.01 
LEV 0.09 2.95*** 0.00 
LIQ -0.01 -0.65 0.52 
PRO 0.16 0.89 0.38 
EF -0.04 -1.39 0.17 
GW 0.06 3.00*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.00 -0.44 0.66 
SIZE 0.01 2.32** 0.02 
LEV 0.01 3.38*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 0.04 0.97 
PRO -0.01 -2.83** 0.01 
EF 0.00 -2.23** 0.03 
GW 0.00 -2.03** 0.04 
DIV 0.00 -0.06 0.95 
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Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Upside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.24 -2.70** 0.01 
SIZE 0.09 2.50** 0.01 
LEV 0.00 0.10 0.92 
LIQ -0.07 -2.87*** 0.00 
PRO 0.06 0.28 0.78 
EF -0.02 -0.68 0.50 
GW 0.06 3.20*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.08 0.94 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.00 -0.12 0.90 
SIZE 0.01 1.97* 0.05 
LEV 0.00 1.94* 0.05 
LIQ 0.00 -1.44 0.15 
PRO -0.02 -3.22*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -0.24 0.81 
GW 0.00 3.04*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.88 0.38 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
URt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DSRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
DURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
USRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
UURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2SIZEt + α3LEVt + α4LIQt + α5PROt + α6EFt + α7GWt+ α8DIVt + εi        
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log 
of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, 
measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a firm’s profitability, measured by return on 
assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, measured by asset turnover ratio (total 
revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual percentage change in before interest and taxes 
(EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Table 17 
Lagged non-linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for All the U.S. restaurant 
firms 
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.29 -0.56 0.57 
LagDOI2 -0.14 -0.19 0.85 
SIZE 0.27 5.43*** 0.00 
LEV -0.08 -1.21 0.23 
LIQ 0.02 0.60 0.55 
PRO 0.64 4.34*** 0.00 
EF -0.07 -1.58 0.11 
GW 0.00 -0.34 0.73 
DIV 0.00 0.56 0.57 
Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.01 0.46 0.64 
LagDOI2 -0.02 -0.33 0.74 
SIZE -0.01 -3.48*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.00* 0.05 
LIQ 0.00 -3.29*** 0.00 
PRO -0.03 -4.63*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 2.33** 0.02 
GW 0.00 0.93 0.35 
DIV 0.00 0.43 0.67 
Downside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.40 -0.60 0.55 
LagDOI2 0.41 0.38 0.71 
SIZE 0.15 1.51 0.13 
LEV 0.08 1.17 0.24 
LIQ 0.08 3.18*** 0.00 
PRO 0.31 2.47** 0.01 
EF -0.05 -1.13 0.26 
GW 0.00 0.28 0.78 
DIV 0.00 -0.26 0.79 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.01 0.69 0.49 
LagDOI2 -0.02 -1.00 0.32 
SIZE -0.01 -3.19*** 0.00 
LEV 0.00 2.91*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -1.90* 0.06 
PRO -0.01 -4.57*** 0.00 
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Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
EF 0.00 -0.40 0.69 
GW 0.00 0.37 0.71 
DIV 0.00 1.20 0.23 
Upside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.31 -0.34 0.73 
LagDOI2 1.73 1.20 0.23 
SIZE -0.22 -1.70* 0.09 
LEV -0.13 -1.27 0.20 
LIQ -0.09 -2.72** 0.01 
PRO 0.15 0.86 0.39 
EF -0.02 -0.36 0.72 
GW 0.00 -4.14*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.58 0.56 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.01 0.29 0.77 
LagDOI2 -0.01 -0.14 0.89 
SIZE -0.02 -5.38*** 0.00 
LEV 0.01 2.54** 0.01 
LIQ 0.00 -3.06*** 0.00 
PRO -0.02 -5.13*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 1.77* 0.08 
GW 0.00 0.84 0.32 
DIV 0.00 0.13 0.95 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi       
URt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi       
DSRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
DURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
USRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
UURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; LagDOI2 = the squared form of 
LagDOI; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total 
debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a 
firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, 
measured by asset turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual 
percentage change in before interest and taxes (EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by 
dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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Table 19 
Lagged non-linear effects of internationalization on market-based risk for U.S. restaurant firms 
with international operations  
Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -1.13 -1.60 0.11 
LagDOI2 1.67 1.51 0.13 
SIZE 0.37 2.13** 0.03 
LEV 0.18 2.00* 0.05 
LIQ -0.01 -0.14 0.89 
PRO 0.41 1.76* 0.08 
EF 0.22 2.49** 0.01 
GW 0.05 2.75** 0.01 
DIV 0.00 -0.27 0.79 
Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.01 -1.03 0.31 
LagDOI2 0.01 0.84 0.40 
SIZE 0.00 -3.89*** 0.00 
LEV 0.00 2.55** 0.01 
LIQ 0.00 -1.12 0.26 
PRO -0.05 -7.03*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 0.73 0.47 
GW 0.00 0.93 0.35 
DIV 0.00 -0.52 0.60 
Downside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.58 -2.32** 0.02 
LagDOI2 0.39 1.22 0.22 
SIZE 0.09 2.84** 0.01 
LEV 0.10 3.17*** 0.00 
LIQ -0.01 -0.34 0.73 
PRO 0.15 0.81 0.42 
EF -0.03 -1.25 0.21 
GW 0.06 2.93*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 0.04 0.97 
Downside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.02 1.50 0.13 
LagDOI2 -0.04 -2.13** 0.03 
SIZE 0.01 2.47** 0.01 
LEV 0.01 3.45*** 0.00 
LIQ 0.00 -0.22 0.82 
PRO -0.01 -2.74** 0.01 
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Variable Coefficients z-value p-value 
EF 0.00 -2.62** 0.01 
GW 0.00 -1.91* 0.06 
DIV 0.00 0.67 0.50 
Upside Systematic Risk 
LagDOI -0.43 -1.50 0.13 
LagDOI2 0.25 0.68 0.50 
SIZE 0.09 2.59** 0.01 
LEV 0.01 0.24 0.81 
LIQ -0.06 -2.61** 0.01 
PRO 0.05 0.24 0.81 
EF -0.02 -0.60 0.55 
GW 0.06 3.16*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.09 0.93 
Upside Unsystematic Risk 
LagDOI 0.01 0.91 0.36 
LagDOI2 -0.03 -1.19 0.24 
SIZE 0.01 2.06** 0.04 
LEV 0.00 1.97* 0.05 
LIQ 0.00 -1.59 0.11 
PRO -0.02 -3.17*** 0.00 
EF 0.00 -0.47 0.64 
GW 0.00 3.12*** 0.00 
DIV 0.00 -0.42 0.67 
Note. The table reports the results of the following regressions: 
SRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi       
URt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi       
DSRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
DURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
USRt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
UURt= α0 + α1 LagDOIt-1 + α2LagDOI2t-1 + α3SIZEt + α4LEVt + α5LIQt + α6PROt + α7EFt+ α8GWt + α9DIVt  + εi        
Where, SR = systematic risk; UR = unsystematic risk; DSR = downside systematic risk; DUR = downside 
unsystematic risk; USR = upside systematic risk; UUR = upside unsystematic risk; LagDOI = degree of 
internationalization, measured by the number of foreign units/total units at t-1; LagDOI2 = the squared form of 
LagDOI; SIZE = a firm size, measured by log of total revenues; LEV = a firm’s capital structure, measured by total 
debt/total assets; LIQ = a firm’s liquidity, measured by current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PRO =  a 
firm’s profitability, measured by return on assets (net income/total assets); EF= a firm’s operating efficiency, 
measured by asset turnover ratio (total revenues/total assets); GW =  a firm’s growth, measured by annual 
percentage change in before interest and taxes (EBIT); and DIV = a firm’s dividend payout ratio, measured by 
dividends per common share/earnings per share.  
* p < 0.10;  **   p < 0.05;  ***  p < 0.01. 
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